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INTRODUCTION
AM HONORED and privileged to present the "Recent Devel-
opments in Aviation Law" paper for the 2002 SMU Air Law
Symposium. The year 2001 brought immense tragedy and sor-
row for the aviation industry specifically and for our country as a
whole. We will not fully know nor understand for many years
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the extent of the changes wrought by the events of September
11, 2001.
In light of these events, I will attempt to provide a reasonably
comprehensive review of the significant legislation and regula-
tions that arose out of the terrorist attacks, the "normal" annual
review of significant case law and a few final comments on the
new proposed aircraft fractional ownership regulations. This re-
view will cover December 2000 through the end of December
2001. With respect to my report on case law, I will cover all of
the major reported federal circuit, district and state court cases,
as well as unreported decisions that appeared to add points of
interest. Note that I present some cases in only one section of
the paper, even though they may cover a range of issues dis-
cussed in other sections. The task was enormous, and it is inevi-
table that I missed, or misread, some cases, which should not be
interpreted as any type of reflection on the importance of that
particular matter.
Finally, as this was a "solo" flight on my part, any errors or
omissions in this paper rest solely upon my own shoulders. For
those I offer my humble apologies.
-DAVID T. NORTON
I. RECENT AVIATION LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE TERRORIST
ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
A. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of terrorists
hijacked four commercial airliners. The terrorists crashed two
of the aircraft into Towers I and II of the World Trade Center in
New York City, both of which subsequently collapsed. The ter-
rorists crashed a third aircraft into the Pentagon. The fourth
crashed into a field in Pennsylvania, apparently as the passen-
gers attempted to gain control of the aircraft.
These terrorist acts have caused a sea change in aviation and
aviation security, both in the United States and around the
world. The immediate affect was a total ground stop order,
bringing all aviation activity in the United States (other than
military and law enforcement flights) to a complete halt.
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted two major pieces of avia-
tion legislation-the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabi-
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lization Act' and the Aviation Transportation Security Act.2 It
will arguably take many years to determine what long-term af-
fects these terrorist acts will have on aviation specifically and our
society in general.
B. COMMERCIAL AVIATION COMPENSATION AND STABILIZATION
1. The Stabilization Act
On September 22, 2001, President Bush signed the Air Trans-
portation Safety and System Stabilization Act (the "Stabilization
Act"). The Stabilization Act contains five substantive sections,
titled and dealing with: (1) airline stabilization, i.e., monetary
assistance to commercial air carriers, (2) aviation insurance, (3)
tax provisions, (4) victim compensation, and (5) air transporta-
tion safety.
a. Title I: Airline Stabilization
Title I provides several forms of substantive relief, as well as
obligations and limitations, to air carriers.4 It also creates a new
Stabilization Board, and addresses rules with respect to essential
air services. Specifically, Section 101, titled "Aviation Disaster
Relief," creates two forms of relief to commercial air carriers:
federal credit instruments and direct compensation. 5 With re-
spect to the credit instruments, Congress granted the President
the authority to issue Federal credit instruments to air carriers,
not to exceed $10 billion in the aggregate. With respect to di-
rect compensation, Congress gave the President the authority to
issue direct compensation not to exceed, in the aggregate, $5
billion to air carriers for (1) losses incurred as a result of the
I Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 el seq. (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
2 Aviation Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
3 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 et seq. (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
4 Section 402(1) of the Stabilization Act, applicable to the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 created by Title IV of the act, defines "air
carrier" as "a citizen of the United States undertaking by any means, directly or
indirectly, to provide air transportation and includes employees and agents of
such citizen." The term "air carrier" is not otherwise defined in the Stabilization
Act, which has lead to some confusion with respect to who may qualify for its
compensation, credit and liability-limitation provisions.
5 Stabilization Act, 115 Stat. 230, §§ 101 (a)(1) and (a)(2), respectively.
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ground stop order and (2) incremental losses incurred between
September 11 and December 11, 2001, as a result of the attacks.6
Sections 103 and 104 of the Stabilization Act provide further
guidance and limitations on the relief granted by Section 101.
Under Section 103, any direct-compensation payments author-
ized by Section 101 (a) (2), and made to an air carrier, cannot
exceed that air carrier's actual losses, with such losses deter-
mined through reports in the form required by the administra-
tion. Under Section 104, the recipients of the credit-
instruments aid authorized under Section 101 (a) (1) must agree
that between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2003, any
employee or officer who earned over $300,000 in 2000 will not
exceed in earnings what they earned in 2000, nor will they re-
ceive severance or other such benefits more than twice what
they earned in 2000.
The Stabilization Act creates a new Air Transportation Stabili-
zation Board (ATSB), composed of (1) the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (or his or her
designee), who is also designated as the chair of the ATSB; (2)
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) (or
his or her designee); (3) the Secretary of the Treasury (or his or
her designee); and (4) the Comptroller General of the United
States (or his or her designee) as a non-voting member of the
ATSB.7
The role of the new ATSB is to administer the issuance of the
credit instruments authorized by Section 101; 8 manage the risk
assumed by the government with respect to these credit instru-
ments;' and see that the government participates in any gains
under this program."' Moreover, Section 102(c) places addi-
tional limitations on the credit-instrument grants authorized
under Section 101 (a) (1) to situations in which:
(A) the obligor is an air carrier for which credit is not reasonably
available at the time of the transaction; (B) the intended obliga-
tion by the obligor is prudently incurred; and (C) such agree-
According to the Department of Transportation, as of December 10, 2002,
$4,602,157,931.90 had been awarded to 410 air carriers under this direction com-
pensation program. See http://www.dot.gov/affairs/carrierpayments.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2003).
7 Stabilization Act, 115 Stat. 230, § 102(b).
S Id. § 102(c).
9 Id. § 102(d)(1).
10 Id. § 102(d) (2).
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ment is a necessary part of maintaining a safe, efficient, and
viable commercial aviation system in the United States."'
Finally, Section 105 of the Stabilization Act requires any recip-
ients of compensation under the act to maintain the air service
they had in place on September 11, 2001.
b. Title II: Aviation Insurance
Section 201 of the Stabilization Act modifies 49 U.S.C.
§ 44302, the provision previously granting the Secretary of
Transportation authority to provide insurance or reinsurance
for aircraft in foreign commerce or any two points outside the
United States, by deleting the geographic restriction and adding
additional authority such that the Secretary may now reimburse
air carriers for the cost of insurance premiums resulting from
September 11. This section also provides that those air carriers
that the Secretary certifies as victim of an act of terrorism:
shall not be responsible for losses suffered by third parties ...
that exceed $100,000.000, in the aggregate, for all claims by such
parties arising out of such act, and the Government shall be re-
sponsible for any liability above such amount. No punitive dam-
ages may be awarded against any air carrier (or the Government
taking responsibility for and air carrier under this paragraph)
under a cause of action arising out of such act. 12
Section 202 authorizes the Secretary to extend the provisions
described above, as well as those found in 49 U.S.C. § 443, to
"vendors, agents and subcontractors of air carriers."
c. Title III: Tax Provisions
Section 301 of the Act modifies the Internal Revenue Code by
extending certain tax due dates for air carriers. The section also
notes that " [n] othing in any provision of law shall be construed
to exclude from gross income under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 any compensation received under section 101 (a) (2) of
this Act [granting authority to provide direct compensation to
air carriers for losses suffered from the terrorist attacks].' 13
II Id. § 102(c).
12 Id. § 201(b) (2).
3 Id. §301(b).
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d. Title IV: Victim Compensation
Title IV of the Stabilization Act may be cited as the "Septem-
ber 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001" (the "Fund").14
The purpose of the Fund is "to provide compensation to any
individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) who was physi-
cally injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001.'
The Attorney General shall appoint a Special Master to ad-
minister the Fund.1" The Special Master must follow a detailed
set of rules with respect to the Fund."7 Among other things, an
individual seeking compensation (a "Claimant") must file his or
her claim with the Special Master within two years after the At-
torney General, acting in consultation with Special Master,
promulgates the procedures for filing. Also, the Act requires
the Special Master and Attorney General to promulgate filing
procedures within 90 days after enactment of the Act.'" The
Fund further provides guidelines for eligibility, factors to con-
sider in awarding a claim (which, with respect to a Claimant spe-
cifically cannot include negligence or any other theory of
liability), and a 120 day deadline for responding to each claim.'9
Other significant aspects of the Fund limit a Claimant's reme-
dies. A Claimant may not receive punitive damages; the Claim-
ant's award shall be reduced by the amount of "Collateral
Source"-life insurance, pension funds, death benefit pro-
grams, and payments by Federal, State, or local governments re-
lated to the terrorist acts-already received by the Claimant; and
by submitting a claim, the Claimant waives the right to file or be
a part of a civil action for damages sustained due to the terrorist
attacks. 20 Along these lines, the Fund also provides that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, liability for all
claims, whether for compensatory or punitive damages, arising
from the [terrorist attacks] against any air carrier shall not be in
an amount greater than the limits of the liability coverage main-
tained by the air carrier."' 21 Moreover, the Act also creates an
exclusive federal cause of action for damages arising out of the
"I Id. § 401.
15 Id. § 403.
16 Id. § 404.
17 Id. § 405.
18 Id. § 407.
19 Id. § §405(a).
20 Id. § 405(b), (c)(3)(B).
21 Id. § 408(a).
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crashes of the four aircraft, provides that the substantive law to
be applied shall be the law of the state where the crash occurred
(except where preempted by federal law), and sets the original
and exclusive jurisdiction for all such actions in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.22
e. Title V: Air Transportation Safety
Finally, Title V serves as a precursor to later action by the Con-
gress, affirming the President's decision to spend
$3,000,000,000 on airline safety and security and stating its com-
mitment to pass further legislation on air travel security. 23
2. Order and Regulations
Since the enactment of the Stabilization Act, the DOT and
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have issued at
least two orders and two sets of regulations specifically related to
the Act.
The DOT issued its Airline Industry Conditions Order on Sep-
tember 28, 2001, under the authority of the new Stabilization
Act, in order to "monitor industry developments and to use our
authority as appropriate to alleviate recent industry problems, to
provide advice and analysis to Congress, and to implement legis-
lation enacted by Congress. ' 24 The original Order required re-
porting to begin within two days after its issuance, required
"real-time" reporting, and was open ended as to its duration.
Attachment A to the Order listed the specific airlines that were
required to respond, and Attachment B listed the data to be re-
ported. This included financial data and analysis (including
changes in compensation for airline executives), operations
data and analysis (including potential employee furloughs), traf-
fic and fare data and analysis, and bookings and cancellations
data and analysis.
Due to significant industry outcry, the DOT modified the Or-
der on October 12, 2001.25 The modified Order ended the re-
,2 Id. § 408(b).
'3 The Act also has one last non-substantive title: Title VI-Separability. Id.
§ 601.
24 DOT Order 2001-9-18, Airline Industry Conditions, DOT Dkt. No. OST-
2001-10709-1 (Sept. 28, 2001), as amended, DOT Dkt. No. OST-2001-10709-2 (Oct.
12, 2001); DOT Dkt. No. OST-2001-10709-1 1.
25 DOT Dkt. No. 10709-2 2; see also Brian F. Havel and Michael G. Whitaker,
The Approach of Re-Regulation: The Airline Industry After September 11, 2001, in CCH
ISSUES IN AVIATION LAw & POLICY 7-12 (November 2001).
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porting time on December 31, 2001 and required noticeably less
onerous data from carriers (including the deletion of the re-
quirement to provide executive compensation information).
DOT Order 2001-9-1826 responds to Section 105 of the Stabili-
zation Act, although it appears to rest most of its regulatory au-
thority on the scope of the small community service program
created by 49 U.S.C. §§ 41731-42. Among other things, it re-
quires the airlines to provide advance notice of any plans to sub-
stantially reduce or end a community's domestic scheduled
passenger service, and expires on its own terms as of December
31, 2001.
On October 5, 2001, the OMB issued in final-rule form its
Regulations For Air Carrier Guarantee Loan Program under
Section 101 (a) (1) of the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act.27 The regulations spell out in detail how the
new Air Transportation Stabilization Board will implement the
three conditions of eligibility for federal credit assistance pre-
scribed in Section 102(c) (2) (B) and for the credit assistance au-
thorized by Section 101 (a) (1) of the Act.
On October 29, 2001, the DOT published its final rules and
request for comments in its Procedures for Compensation of Air
Carriers. 8 In response to comments received, DOT amended
the new regulations effective December 26, 2001.29 The regula-
tions provide detailed guidelines for awarding direct compensa-
tion to air carriers authorized under Section 101 (a) (2) of the
Act.
C. AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
1. The Transportation Security Act
After considerable disagreement between the two houses, on
November 17, 2001, Congress passed, and on November 19,
President Bush signed, the Aviation Transportation Security Act
"6 DOT Order 2001-9-18, Reports on Significant Airline Service Reductions,
DOT Dkt. No. OST-2001-10711 (Sept. 27, 2001).
27 Aviation Disaster Relief-Air Carrier Guarantee Loan Program, 14 C.F.R.
Part 1300 (2002).
28 Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, 66 F.R. 54616 (Oct. 29, 2001).
29 14 C.F.R. Part 330 (Oct. 29, 2001), published at 67 F.R. 18468; see DOT, Air
Carrier Compensation at http://www.dot.gov/accomp.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2003) (noting that Part 330 was amended in the Federal Register on Apr. 16,
2002, and providing a copy of the proposed amendments).
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(the "Security Act")."' The Security Act is largely based on the
Senate's version of the proposed bill, S.B. 1447.
a. New Transportation Security Administration
Significantly, the Security Act creates a new federal agency
within the DOT, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), to be headed by the new Under Secretary of Transporta-
tion for Security." On December 10, 2001, DOT Secretary
Mineta announced his intended nomination of John Magaw, a
former director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms as well as the U.S. Secret Service, as the new Under Secre-
tary.3 2 Although the new TSA is largely focused on aviation
issues, the new Under Secretary will be responsible for a multi-
modal agency that could well eclipse the FAA in size and
scope.33
The new Under Secretary was given three months after the
enactment of the Security Act to "assume civil aviation security
functions and responsibilities under chapter 49 of title 49,
United States Code, as amended by this Act," in accordance with
a schedule to be developed by the Secretary of Transportation.34
The Security Act also sets other specific deadlines, such as re-
quiring the new Under Secretary to (1) report to Congress on
immediate safety steps by December 19, 2001;"5 (2) begin the
collection of passenger and air carrier security fees by January
18, 2002;11 (3) provide certification to Congress that the federal-
ization of screening process has been completed by November
30 Aviation Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 et seq.
(2001) (codified throughout 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq.). The Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference from the House of Representatives
Conference Report provides a good overview of the significant portions of the
new Security Act. H.R. REP. No. 107-296, at 54-81 (2001). For an excellent arti-
cle that also provides a detailed overview of the Security Act, see Frank J. Costello
and Robert A. DeHaan, The New Face of Aviation Security: An Overview of the Aviation
Transportation Security Act, CCH ISSUES IN AVIATION LAW & POLICY (Nov. 2001).
31 Security Act, 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2002).
32 See, e.g., Press Release, DOT, U.S. Transportation Secretary Mineta An-
nounces Intended Nomination of Magaw as Under Secretary of Transportation
for Security (Dec. 10, 2001), at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot12301.htm.
33 See 49 U.S.C. § 114(d).
.1'1 49 U.S.C. § 114(g).
-5 49 U.S.C. § 44903.
36 49 U.S.C. § 44940.
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19, 2002;17 and (4) commence the private screening opt-out
program at the by November 19, 2004."
b. Functions of the New Under Secretary of Transportation
for Security-Emergency Orders and Federalized
Screening
The Under Secretary has broad emergency rulemaking au-
thority. Should he or she determine that a "regulation or secur-
ity directive must be issued immediately in order to protect
transportation security," the TSA may do so without following
any of the normal promulgatory or review processes.3 9 The Se-
curity Act also provided a mechanism for review of such emer-
gency orders in the form of a new Transportation Security
Oversight Board (the "TSOB"), but the TSOB's role is limited to
either ratifying or disapproving the emergency action within
thirty days of its issuance.4"
Arguably the most immediate, visual and controversial provi-
sion of the new Security Act is the federalization of all passen-
ger, baggage and cargo screening services.41 The details in the
Security Act are long, complex, and comprehensive. They
range, for example, from (1) the minimum hiring standards for
new screeners (including the requirements of U.S. citizenship,
have a certain minimum education, and a background security
check),42 to (2) the time frame for the transition from air-car-
rier-controlled screening to federalized screening (beginning
three months after enactment and being completed no later
than one year after enactment)," to (3) an increase in penalties,
making assault of any person with aviation security duties in the
performance of those duties a federal felony.44
That being said, the Security Act does create two options for
the use of private screening companies, drafted as a compro-
mise between House and Senate versions of the original bill.45
The first option allows the Under Secretary to start a pilot pro-
37 49 U.S.C. § 44901.
-1 49 U.S.C. § 44919.
39 49 U.S.C. § 114(I) (s) (A).
40 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(1)(2) (B), 115.
41 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(g); H.R. REP. No. 107-296, Sect. 21, at 63-64 (2001)
(joint conference comments on federalization provisions).
42 See 49 U.S.C. § 44935.
43 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(g), 44901 (a).
44 49 U.S.C. § 46503.
45 H.R. REP. No. 107-296, Sect. 21.
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gram at no more than five airports in which private screening
companies would perform to all of the standards required of the
federal workers. The second is an opt-out program, with essen-
tially the same requirements as the pilot program, but begin-
ning two years after the Under Secretary certifies that the
federalization process has been completed at the airport in
question."
The Security Act also directs the TSA to develop programs for
the increased screening of checked-baggage. Two of its more
controversial deadlines require the TSA to have a system in
place to screen all checked baggage no later than January 11,
2002, as well as explosive detection systems. Where such systems
are not available, alternative systems such as bag-matching, man-
ual search or explosives detecting dogs-no later than Decem-
ber 31, 2002. 47
The new TSA must develop a screening program for air cargo
as soon as practicable, without facing a hard deadline.48 Finally,
the Under Secretary may at his or her discretion, require air-
ports to maximize their use of technology to detect or neutralize
chemical or biological weapons.4 '
The Security Act also transfers to the TSA essentially all of the
security functions performed by the DOT and the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA), such as, (1) research and develop-
ment funding and responsibilities;5" (2) functions relating to
the testing of airport screeners;5' and (3) functions related to
drug and alcohol testing.5 2
c. Funding
The Security Act authorizes the TSA to impose user fees on
both passengers and air carriers to help pay for the new security
efforts.53 It also authorizes (but does not appropriate) some
$1.5 billion in federal funding to airports, 54 as well as an addi-
,6 49 U.S.C. § 44919.
47 49 U.S.C. § 44901(c).
48 49 U.S.C. § 44901(f).
49 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c) (2) (C).
51 49 U.S.C. § 44912.
5 49 U.S.C. § 45107.
52 49 U.S.C. § 45102.
5" 49 U.S.C. § 44940.
5,1 49 U.S.C.§ 44903.
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tional $500 million to air carriers for specific safety measures
such as fortified cockpit doors.55
d. Coordination with Other Federal Agencies
The Security Act does not apply only to the TSA, nor does it
allow the TSA to operate in complete isolation. For example,
when issuing emergency regulations or directives, the TSA may
not take a security action if the FAA notifies the Under Secretary
that the proposed action "could adversely affect the airworthi-
ness of an aircraft." However, the Secretary of Transportation
can overrule the FAA on the point.5 6 Likewise, the TSA must
"give great weight to the timely views" of the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (although what this actually means is
unclear).
e. Airport Security
The Security Act also extensively improves airport perimeter
access security. 58 For example, the Under Secretary may "order
the deployment of [airport and law enforcement] personnel at
any secure area of the airport as necessary to counter the risk of
criminal violence." Also, the Under Secretary may enter into a
memorandum with the Attorney General to deploy federal law
enforcement personnel to meet airport security concerns.5"
Among other things, the Under Secretary must create a perime-
ter screening program, develop a plan to provide assistance to
small and medium airports, continually test for compliance with
access control requirements and establish pilot programs at no
fewer than 20 airports to evaluate emerging access technology
such as biometrics.6 °
The Security Act also addresses airport security with respect to
those who work at the airport. The Security Act significantly ex-
pands background check requirements, requiring not only
those with unescorted access but also those with escorted access
to be checked (possibly meaning the checking of hundreds of
thousands of additional individuals). Moreover, the checks
55 49 U.S.C. § 41309 note.
56 49 U.S.C. § 114(1)(4).
57 49 U.S.C. § 114(i).
58 See 49 U.S.C. § 44903.
59 49 U.S.C. § 44903(h).
60 Id.
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must be conducted in greater depth and coordination with
other federal agencies. 6
f. Other Commercial-Aviation-Specific Security Issues
The Security Act also addresses an extremely broad range of
other issues. For example, it directs the FAA (in one of the few
security tasks it retains) to take specific steps with regard to cock-
pit security.12 It calls for an increase in the number of federal
air marshals;63 a waiting period for aliens who wish to take cer-
tain flight training in the United States, as well as changes to the
airman registry databases;64 specific additional training for air-
crew members on how to address attempted hijackings;65 lim-
ited liability provisions for airline employees who report
suspicious circumstances as well as for "self-help" actors and
"good Samaritans" who assist in thwarting hijacking attempts;""
the arming of pilots in certain circumstances;67 as well as studies
into using "stun guns" to subdue hijackers; 68 and mandatory use
of the Customs Service's Advanced Passenger Information Sys-
tem with respect to passenger manifests for flights in-bound to
the United States. 69
g. General Aviation Security and General Airspace
Restrictions
The Security Act also puts into statutory form the temporary
flights restrictions and general aviation security rules previously
issued by the FAA for charter operators and all "large" aircraft."
It also addressed a great sore point for general aviation opera-
tors, automatically terminating the remaining flight restrictions
in Enhanced Class B airspace around Boston, New York and
Washington, D.C.7 '
61 49 U.S.C. § 4496.
62 See 49 U.S.C. § 44903.
63 49 U.S.C. § 44917.
1A 49 U.S.C. §§ 44939, 44703(g).
,i5 49 U.S.C. § 44918.
66 49 U.S.C. §§ 44944, 44903.
67 49 U.S.C. § 44903.
6- 49 U.S.C. § 44941.
69 49 U.S.C. § 44903.
70 49 U.S.C. § 44903. See Aircraft Security Under General Operating and
Flight Rules, SFAR No. 91, 66 F.R. 50,531 (Oct. 4, 2001).
71 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note.
1122
2002] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
h. Other Miscellaneous Issues
Finally, the Security Act touches on a range of other issues,
such as DOT's immunization authority on antitrust issues,72 the
FAA's promulgation of foreign carrier overflight fees,7 3 and a
range of technical and conforming provisions, including all of
Title II of the Security Act, which addresses nothing by modify-
ing and extending various provisions of the Stabilization Act.
2. Related Regulatory Activity
The DOT, FAA and new TSA have also been active on the
regulatory front. After many years of effort, the FAA issued its
final rules substantially rewriting Parts 107 and 139 (Airport Se-
curity) and 108 (Aircraft Operator Security) in July, 2001, 7 as
well as a final rule on "Temporary Flight Restrictions. ' 75 After
all the effort, much of the FAA's work has been potentially ne-
gated by the Security Act in the aftermath of September 11.
The activity in direct response to the acts of September 11
included final rules on "Aircraft Security Under General Operat-
ing and Flight Rules"'76 and "Flightcrew Compartment Access
and Door Designs. ' 77 This activity also included a proposed rule
from the FAA titled "Procedures for Reimbursement of Airports,
On-Airport Parking Lots and Vendors of On-Airfield Direct Ser-
vices to Air Carriers for Security, '78 a request for comment from
DOT titled "Firearms, Less-Than-Lethal Weapons, and Emer-
gency Services on Commercial Air Flights, ' 79 and-what I be-
lieve is the new TSA's first published rule-an interim final rule
titled "Imposition and Collection of Passenger Civil Aviation Se-
curity Fees.""
72 49 U.S.C. § 44940.
7-1 49 U.S.C. §§ 47102, 47110.
74 See, e.g. 14 C.F.R. Parts 107 and 139 Airport Security, Final Rule, 66 F.R.
37,274 (July 17, 2001).
75 66 F.R. 47,373 (Sept. 11, 2001).
76 66 F.R. 50,531 (Oct. 4, 2001).
77 66 F.R. 51,546 (Oct. 9, 2001).
78 66 F.R. 66,238 (Dec. 21, 2001).
79 66 F.R. 67,620 (Dec. 31, 2001).
80 66 F.R. 67,798 (Dec. 31, 2001).
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II. REVIEW OF CASE LAW
A. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS IN WARSAW
CONVENTION CARRIAGE
1. Scope of the Convention and the "Tseng Preemptive Effect"
During 2001, a number of courts addressed personal injury
actions arising under or affected by the Warsaw Convention."
Issues going to the scope of the Convention with respect to per-
sonal injury claims included further interpretations of the terms
"accident," "bodily injury," and "embarking or disembarking"
from Article 17 of the Convention, 2 the application of the Con-
vention to non-ticketed passengers, its application to claims of
delayed transportation and racial discrimination, and the appli-
cation of the Convention with respect to airline security check
point agents.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng directly impacted all of these cases.83 In
Tseng, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention essentially
preempts all state law causes of action arising from international
flights, even if the claimant cannot meet the various elements of
a Convention claim and is thus precluded from any recovery
whatsoever.8 4 All of the cases alluded to above deal with, and
further interpret, the Court's holdings in Tseng.
a. Definitions of "Accident" and "Willful Misconduct" in
Article 17, and the Question of Emotional Injuries
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit dealt with Tseng in Carey v. United
Airlines, Inc. 5 In Carey, the appellate court-while reviewing the
81 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Concluded at Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 12, 1929, adhered to
by the United StatesJune 27, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014, T.S. No. 876, reprinted in
note following 49 U.S.C. § 40105 [hereinafter the "Warsaw Convention" or the
"Convention"].
82 Article 17 of the Convention establishes the conditions under which an air-
line may be liable for the injuries of passengers:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of em-
barking or disembarking.
8' El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
84 Id. at 176. For an excellent review of the Tseng decision, as well as its early
progeny, see Blanca I. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law, 66J.
AIR L. & CoM. 21, 44-48 (2000).
85 Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
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district court's granting of summary judgment to defendant
United Airlines, Inc. (the "airline")-addressed the question of
whether plaintiff Gordon T. Carey's ("Carey") allegations of
"willful misconduct" were nonetheless "accidents" under Article
17, and, in the wake of Tseng, whether the Convention was
therefore Carey's exclusive remedy.
Mr. Carey filed suit against the airline for damages arising out
of an incident between him and a flight attendant while flying
from Costa Rica to Los Angeles. 6 Carey sat in the first-class
cabin, while his daughters sat in the coach class section. During
the flight, one of his daughters left her seat in coach and came
to Carey, complaining of earaches. The flight attendants
warned Carey that his children were not allowed in first class,
and Carey responded that his children were ill. When another
daughter joined Carey in first class, the same flight attendant
warned Carey again, and an argument ensued between the
two.
8 7
After the flight, Carey brought suit against the airline, assert-
ing state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional and
mental distress, negligent infliction of emotional and mental
distress, and false imprisonment.8 8 Ruling that Carey's allega-
tions of willful misconduct did not exempt his claims from the
Warsaw Convention, that the Convention was his exclusive rem-
edy, and that he failed to satisfy the Convention's requirements,
the lower court granted the airline's motion for summary
judgment.8 9
On appeal, Carey tried to distinguish his case from the exclu-
sivity ruling in Tseng by asserting that since the Warsaw Conven-
tion does not apply to claims arising out of intentional or willful
misconduct, Tseng should not be read to hold that the Warsaw
Convention is the exclusive remedy for such claims against an
air carrier.9" In the alternative, Carey claimed that the physical
manifestations of his emotional and mental distress satisfied the
"bodily injury" requirement thus qualifying him for recovery
under the Warsaw Convention. 9'
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. With respect to his first argu-
ment, the court felt that Carey's view as to the exclusivity of the
86 Id. at 1045.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1045-46.
89 Id. at 1046.
90 Id. at 1048.
9) Id. at 1051.
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Warsaw Convention rested on a faulty view of the Warsaw Con-
vention's liability scheme, noting (from dictum in the Tseng
opinion) that the definition of an "accident" is an "unusual
event.., external to the passenger and that it should be flexibly
applied. '9 2 As such, the court concluded that:
Based on the supreme court's interpretation of the term 'acci-
dent' in Article 17 and the history of Article 25, including cases
interpreting its provisions, we see no basis for concluding that
the Warsaw Convention does not apply to claims arising out of
intentional misconduct. Because the Warsaw Convention does
apply to such claims, Carey has a remedy. Under Tseng, it is his
only one. Thus, the district court was correct to conclude that
Carey was required to satisfy the Warsaw Convention's conditions
in order to recover for his alleged injuries.93
The court turned next to Carey's allegations that his emo-
tional injuries satisfied the requirement for a "bodily injury"
under the Warsaw Convention. The Ninth Circuit followed the
Third Circuit's reasoning in Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways,
Ltd.,94 and held that physical manifestations of emotional and
mental distress do not satisfy the "bodily injury" requirement in
Article 17. Moreover, the court felt that to rule otherwise
would undermine the Supreme Court's reasoning in Eastern Air-
lines, Inc. v. Floyd;', if the court were to conclude that the draft-
ers of the Convention intended to compensate passengers who
merely suffered physical manifestations of their emotional and
mental distress, "plaintiffs would then be able to skirt Floyd's bar
on recovery for 'purely emotion injuries' simply by alleging that
they suffered some physical manifestations of those injures, no
matter how slight or remote. 9 7
Since the court concluded that the Warsaw Convention was
Carey's exclusive remedy and that the physical manifestations of
his emotional and mental distress did not satisfy the "bodily in-
jury" requirement in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, Ca-
rey was unable to recover. Accordingly, the lower court
appropriately granted summary judgment for the airline.9"
92 Id. at 1049.
93 Id. at 1051.
94 Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1998).
95 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052.
96 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
97 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052.
1- Id. at 1054.
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Another case dealing with the scope of the term "accident" in
Article 17, in conjunction with the preemptive effects of Tseng,
was the opinion of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas in McCaskey v. Continental Airlines,
Inc.9 ' During a trip in September 1998 on board a Continental
Airlines aircraft from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to Frankfurt, Germany,
with stops in Houston and Newark, Ralph and Mary McCaskey
had a disagreement with a gate agent that induced stress on the
couple. A delay at the gate in Houston further exacerbated the
stress because the aircraft became uncomfortably warm.' 0 Dur-
ing the flight from Houston to Newark, Mr. McCaskey then suf-
fered a stroke. 1"
The crew received assistance from a nurse onboard the air-
craft, as well as from MedAire, Inc., a company under contract
with Continental to provide medical assistance during flight op-
erations. Based on conversations between the crew, the nurse
and a doctor with MedAire, the crew decided to complete the
flight to Newark (although there appeared to be some confu-
sion between the parties as to Mr. McCaskey's condition and the
time remaining in the flight). Mr. McCaskey was hospitalized
for approximately two weeks after landing at Newark, and died
while on a train trip from New Jersey back to Tulsa.'1 2
Mrs. McCaskey filed suit against Continental in September
2000, and joined MedAire as a defendant in October 2000. She
brought claims under state law for negligence and wrongful
death on behalf of her husband, and, in her own behalf, for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, for bystander mental
distress, and for a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act.'0 3 The district court issued its opinion in August 2001
on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, addressing
three issues: (1) whether an "accident" occurred during the
flight; (2) if an accident did occur, whether the accident caused
Mr. McCaskey's stroke or subsequent death; and (3) with re-
spect to Mrs. McCaskey's claims for personal injury brought on
her own behalf, whether she had suffered a compensable "physi-
cal injury.""' 4
99 McCaskey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D. Tex.
2001).
100 Id. at 565.
-1 Id. at 566.
102 Id. at 567-68.
103 Id. at 568.
104 Id. at 570.
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After extensive review of the existing case law, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence of at
least three potential "accidents" under the Warsaw Convention
to withstand a motion for summary judgment. These included
evidence of Continental's actions before the flight in Houston,
the "overheat" condition that occurred on the ground in Hous-
ton, and the lack of response to Mr. McCaskey's stroke during
the flight from Houston. 05 The court further concluded that
Mrs. McCaskey had introduced some evidence showing that
these accidents had caused the stroke, and that she had thus
established a prima facie showing of causation sufficient to with-
stand summary judgment.'0 6
Turning to the question of the physical injury requirement
under the Warsaw Convention, the court noted that the position
of Tseng and its progeny that neither psychic nor psychosomatic
injuries are recoverable absent a traditional injury under the
Warsaw Convention. The court proceeded to observe that:
[T]he Court need not reach, at this juncture, whether Mrs. Mc-
Caskey can recover directly from any solely psychic or psychoso-
matic injuries, because these injuries are available to Mrs.
McCaskey irrespective of the precise nature of her own injuries.
This is so because Mr. McCaskey's physical injury, if caused by an
accident, satisfies the "gateway bodily injury requirement."10 7
The court based this position on Zicherman v. Korean Airlines
Co. 8 In Zicherman, the Supreme Court indicated that the War-
saw Convention permits recovery of "damage sustained" once a
compensable accident causing physical injury has been estab-
lished, and legally cognizable damages are ascertained under
the "domestic law" of the forum court.0 9 Assuming that Mr. Mc-
Caskey's injuries could satisfy all of the basic elements for com-
pensable injury under the Warsaw Convention, the court
concluded that Mrs. McCaskey could potentially recover for
mental damages arising from the physical harm sustained by her
husband under Texas law."0 As such, Continental's motion for
summary judgment was denied.'"
105 Id. at 571-74.
'06 Id. at 574-75.
107 Id. at 575-76.
1)8 Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
1- Id. at 221.
4) McCaskey, 159 F. Supp. at 576-77.
The court also discussed, and dismissed, Mrs. McCaskey's Texas DTPA
claims as well as her claims against MedAire and Gordon Bethune, the Chief
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Finally, in the recent opinion in Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Air-
lines, the district court begins by observing that: "This case in-
volves the meaning and usage of the common word 'accident' in
an uncommon sense. Ordinary as the term is, as defined and
applied in the context of the Warsaw Convention, it has engen-
dered extensive debate and varying, sometimes contradictory
court decisions."'1 12 After conducting an extensive review on the
case law addressing the term "accident" in the Convention, as
well as Article 17 in general, the court ruled that the plaintiffs
heart attack was not an accident, but the crew's failure to divert
the aircraft was an "accident." Moreover, the plaintiff raised a
trivial issue of willful misconduct as to whether the crew deviated
from normal procedures in failing to divert the aircraft. 13
b. Definition of "Bodily Injury" and "Disembarking" in
Article 17
One federal district court case dealing with the Article 17
terms "bodily injury" and "disembarking" under the dictates of
Tseng was Turturro v. Continental Airlines.'14 In Turturro, defen-
dant Continental Airlines sought summary judgment while
plaintiff Joan Turturro sought leave to amend if revisions to her
complaint could cure any defect. The matter arose when plain-
tiff, who had been taking Xanax on a daily basis for panic attacks
and to relieve anxiety and nervousness, discovered after board-
ing the aircraft that her purse, including her medication, had
been stolen." 15 After several different flight attendants told her
that she could not get off the aircraft, the plaintiff panicked and
repeatedly called "911" begging for help. The police in turn
contacted the pilot, who then decided to return to the gate. A
flight attendant escorted her off the aircraft and into a waiting
area, where she was met by additional Continental personnel,
medical personnel, and the police. After discussions between all
of the parties, the police decided to transport the plaintiff
Executive Officer of Continental Airlines (who just happened to be on the
flight), the former based on the statute of limitations and the latter on her failure
to show any potential liability on Mr. Bethune's part. Id. at 578-81.
112 Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 653 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
113 Id. at 673.
14 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
115 Id. at 173.
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against her will to a psychiatric emergency room, where she re-
mained in custody for several hours." 6
Plaintiff filed suit in January 2000 alleging damages for em-
barrassment, humiliation, loss of liberty, psychological injury,
pain, suffering, emotional distress and mental anguish." 7 In re-
sponse to discovery, she also alleged posttraumatic stress, psy-
chological injury and pain. Plaintiff's proposed amended
complaint then alleged various causes of action against Conti-
nental including false imprisonment of plaintiff "in concert
with" the police, common law false imprisonment, defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and discrimination
on the basis of a medical condition.1 8
The court first ruled that the plaintiff had not sufficiently al-
leged "bodily injury," and thus her Warsaw Convention claims
failed. Specifically, like the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Carey, the
district court relied on the Supreme Court's Floyd decision to
conclude that the definition of "bodily injury" in the Conven-
tion excludes psychosomatic illnesses unaccompanied by physi-
cal injury or physical manifestation of injury." 9 Interestingly,
the court also noted that there is some disagreement among the
district and circuit courts with respect to the current status of
post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). Notwithstanding the
possibility of PTSD constituting a physical injury, the court felt
that the present case paralleled others in which the plaintiff had
not advanced, with the requisite specificity, either a brain lesion
theory of PTSD or individualized proof of such lesions.2 1
Citing Tseng, the court next ruled-even though the plaintiff
could not meet the prerequisites of an Article 17 claim-that
the Convention effectively preempted all of her claims with re-
spect to the incidents that occurred on the aircraft or while dis-
embarking.' 12 As part of this analysis, the court disagreed with
plaintiff's assertion that Congress had excluded the Air Carrier
Access Act 22 from the Convention's preemptive effect.
Therefore, the Court had to deal with the question of when
plaintiff's "disembarking" had terminated. Based on prior cases
indicating that disembarking has terminated once the airline no
11i Id.
117 Id. at 174.
118 ld.
1) Id. at 175-76.
120 Id. at 178-79.
121 [d. at 180.
22 Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, formerly 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1374.
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longer restricts the passengers movement, the court concluded
that the actions allegedly taken by Continental employees result-
ing in plaintiffs confinement to the psychiatric ward had all oc-
curred after disembarking had terminated. As such, plaintiffs
claims related to those activities survived summary judgment
and she was allowed leave to amend her complaint
accordingly. 23
c. Definition of "Embarking" in Article 17
While Turturro dealt with the question of what constituted dis-
embarking, the court in Marotte v. American Airlines, Inc. dealt
with the term "embarking" under Article 17.124 Specifically, the
Marottes alleged that an American Airlines employee had
punched and pushed Mr. Marotte while they were trying to
enter ajetway at Miami International Airport for a flight to New
York and that he was hospitalized as a result. The Marottes
sued, and American in turn moved for summary judgment, ar-
guing that the claims were governed by the Warsaw Convention
and were therefore barred due to its two-year statute of
limitations. 125
The sole issue for the court's determination was "whether Mr.
Marotte was 'in the course of embarking' the aircraft within the
meaning of the Convention at the time of [the American gate
attendant's] assault."' 21 Using the same three factors adopted in
Turturro for defining "disembarking," the court considered (1)
the passenger's activity at the time of the accident, (2) the pas-
senger's whereabouts at the time of the accident, and (3) the
amount of control exercised by the carrier at the moment of
injury. 127 In light of these three factors, the court concluded
that the alleged assault had in fact occurred during the embark-
ing process. Moreover, citing Tseng, the court noted that the
Convention was plaintiff's sole remedy, and as such, dismissed
plaintiffs suit because it was filed more than two years after the
causes of action accrued. 128
123 Turturro, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 181-82.
124 Marotte v. American Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
125 Id. at 1376.
126 Id. at 1378.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1381.
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d. Scope with Respect to Non-Ticketed Passengers
Over the past year, the courts have dealt with issues going to
the scope of the Convention and arising outside of Article 17
that have been impacted by Tseng. For example, Adjoyi v. Federal
Air (PTY) Ltd. deals with the exclusivity of the Convention in a
case involving non-ticketed passengers. 129 The five wrongful
death claims that were the subject of this lawsuit were brought
after Federal Air flight 803 crashed in Africa in June of 1998.
The five decedents-all United Nations employees-were travel-
ing on a United Nations charter in connection with peacekeep-
ing efforts.
Responding to plaintiffs' argument that the Convention did
not apply because there were no written tickets under this air-
craft charter, the court observed that the "case law is clear that
unticketed, nonfare-paying travelers are still covered by the Con-
vention, as long as there is at some point a 'contract of carriage'
consisting of 'a promise, an undertaking, on the part of the car-
rier to transport or transfer the passenger, and the consent of
the passenger."' The court concluded that these cases applied
in the present case.'""'
Recognizing that, under Tseng, the Convention provided
plaintiff's exclusive remedy, the court then turned to the ques-
tion of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' wrong-
ful death claims. The court determined that under the facts of
the case the plaintiffs could not establish that the United States
was one of the four permissible fora provided in Article 28 (1) of
the Convention. As such, the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the matter and dismissed the complaint
accordingly. '3'
e. Scope with Respect to Delayed Transportation and Racial
Discrimination
In another matter the court analyzed Tseng's preemptive ef-
fect upon allegations of illegal "bumping" and racial discrimina-
tion. In King v. American Airlines, the plaintiffs were involuntarily
bumped off of their scheduled flight, and they brought suit
against the airline claiming that the decision to bump them was
based on their race as African Americans. 3 2 In analyzing the
1'2 Adjoyi v. Fed. Air Ltd., 137 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
130 Id. at 500 (citations omitted).
1-3, Id. at 501-02.
132 King v. American Airlines, 146 F. Supp. 2d 159, 160-61 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
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case under Tseng, the court determined that plaintiffs' claims
fell within Article 19 of the Convention-providing for liability
in the case of the delay in transportation by air passengers-and
as such the Convention provided plaintiffs' exclusive remedy.
f. Application to Airline Security Checkpoint Agents
In the case of Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Services, the Ninth
Circuit applied a similar analysis to a matter in which the plain-
tiffs jewelry was missing from her baggage.13 3 Finding that the
security agent, as the contractor for the airline, fell within the
scope of the Warsaw Convention, the Convention was plaintiffs
exclusive remedy. 134
Moreover, the court concluded that defendant's conduct did
not rise to the level of willful misconduct and dismissed the
plaintiffs argument, based on its earlier decision in Carey that
allegations of "willful misconduct" do not remove the matter
from the purview of the Convention. Accordingly, the appellate
court upheld the lower court's ruling that the plaintiffs claims
for punitive damages could not stand due to the Convention's
liability limiting provisions and that her damages were therefore
capped at $400.'
Finally, it is interesting to note that Judge Tashima issued a
strong dissent from the "majority's unprecedented expansion of
immunity under the Warsaw convention" in finding that the car-
rier's security agent fell within the scope of the Convention. 3"
However, it is unclear to what extent this issue has been mooted
by the enactment of the Security Transportation Act, as dis-
cussed at length in Part I of this paper, replete with its federali-
zation of security screeners.
2. Treaty Jurisdiction and Convention Adherents
In Blake v. American Airlines, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit decided
that Jamaica is a High Contracting Party to the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 137 This case involved a personal injury action against the
air carrier by a passenger who struck his head while being physi-
cally removed from an aircraft after smoking on board a flight
en route from Jamaica to the United States. The plaintiff filed
133 Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Services, 268 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2001).
134 Id. at 676-78.
135 Id. at 679-81.
136 Id. at 681.
157 Blake v. American Airlines, Inc., 245 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2001).
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suit over three years after the accident, and the air carrier in
turn filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the
Convention provided the exclusive remedy and plaintiffs suit
was barred due to the Convention's two-year statute of limita-
tions. The plaintiff replied that the Convention did not apply,
because Jamaica failed to formally ratify the treaty.'38
In analyzing the situation, the court noted that upon gaining
its independence from the United Kingdom, Jamaica had cre-
ated a presumption that it intended to be bound by the Conven-
tion when it expressed the intention to assume all treaty
obligations and rights entered on its behalf by the British gov-
ernment. Even though Jamaica had subsequently acceded to 23
of the 26 multilateral treaties Britain had negotiated on its be-
half, Jamaica nevertheless had taken no steps to denounce the
Convention.
Moreover, the court felt that Jamaica's affirmative conduct
had indicated a clear intent to adopt the Convention's privileges
and obligations. Specifically, Jamaica had taken an active role in
negotiations to amend the Convention and had certified the
Guadalajara Convention, which expressly supplements the War-
saw Convention. Furthermore, Air Jamaica had asserted the
Warsaw Convention as a defense to a lawsuit in the United States
while the carrier was wholly owned by the Jamaican government.
In light of all of these factors, the court concluded that Ja-
maica was in fact a High-Contracting party to the Convention.
As such, the Convention provided the sole remedy for plaintiff,
and because plaintiff did not file his lawsuit within the two-year
statute of limitations, the air carrier's motion for summary judg-
ment was granted. 3 9
3. Choice of Underlying Law
In D'Alessandro v. American Airlines, Inc., the court was faced
with a choice of law question.4 ' The decedent had been a pas-
senger onboard an American Airlines flight from Mexico City to
Dallas, Texas. While in Mexico City, he fell from a mobile pas-
senger lounge vehicle operated by the airline's agents. He sus-
tained severe injuries from the fall and died approximately six
weeks later.
138' Id. at 1214.
13) Id. at 1215-17.
140 D'Alessandro v. American Airlines, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 305 (E.D.N.Y.
2001).
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American Airlines' motion for partial summary judgment
raised several choice of law issues. American Airlines argued
that there was no evidence that its conduct rose to the level of
culpability required under the Convention's Article 25(1) liabil-
ity-limitation exclusion for "willful misconduct."'4 1 The airline
urged that "willful misconduct" requires a finding of intentional
conduct with the intent to cause injury based on an interna-
tional standard, and that the plaintiff was therefore limited to
$75,000 in damages. American acknowledged, however, that
the Second Circuit had held that the law of the Forum state de-
termined the meaning of "willful misconduct," rather than
American's preferred international standard. 4 2
Although the United States' adopted the Montreal Protocol
in 1998 and essentially changed the language in Article 25 to
that preferred by American Airlines, 4 ' the D'Alessandro court re-
lied on legislative intent. Arguably, the D'Alessandro court's ob-
servation that the drafters of the Convention "intended to
resolve whether there is liability, but to leave to domestic law (the
local law identified by the forum under its choice of law rules or
approaches) the determination of the compensatory damages
available to the suitor" is still on point.144
Notwithstanding these changes, the court proceeded with a
choice-of-law analysis under the forum state, New York, and, ulti-
mately concluding that the law of New York applied, the court
denied the carrier's motion for summary judgment because a
141 Article 25(1), as applicable at the time of the incident, provided according
to the English translation "that the $75,000 limitation on damages does not apply
'if the damage is caused by the carrier's willful misconduct or by such default on
his part as, in accordance with the laws of the court to which the case is submit-
ted, is considered to be equivalent of willful misconduct."' D'Alessandro, 139 F.
Supp. 2d at 307.
142 Id. (citing Brinks Ltd. v. South African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022, 1027-29 (2d.
Cir. 1996).
143 The specific language now provides that the limitations of liability "shall
not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the
carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and
with knowledge that damage would probably result," which the courts have read
to mean replaces the earlier definition of willful misconduct with the common-
law definition of willful misconduct. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. British Airways, PLC,
210 F.3d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 2000); Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177
F.3d 1272, 1283-90 (11th Cir. 1999).
144 D'Alessandro, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (quoting Tseng, 525 U.S. at 170) (em-
phasis in original).
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reasonable jury could find that willful misconduct had
occurred. '45
Another choice of law issue arose in In re Air Crash Off Point
Mugu. 146 Here, the parties agreed that the Death on the High
Seas by Wrongful Act 147 did not apply because the accident did
not occur on what is defined as the "high seas," but that admi-
ralty jurisdiction had to be considered because the crash oc-
curred in navigable waters of the United States. 148 Citing to the
Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
Cleveland,141' the Point Mugu court observed that admiralty juris-
diction exists in aviation accidents only where (1) the alleged
wrong occurred on or over navigable waters, and (2) the wrong
is significantly related to maritime activity.'5 '
Finding that the first prong was met the court then relied on
later precedent providing that a wrong is significantly related to
maritime activity "where the airplane was fulfilling a role that,
but for air travel, would have been done by vessel."'' 1 The court
found that the second prong was satisfied as well, and that admi-
ralty jurisdiction therefore applied to the case. 152
4. Jurisdiction and Venue Under the Convention
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In 2001, several courts addressed subject matter jurisdiction
under the Convention. Already noted above was the case of Ad-
joyi v. Federal Air (PTY) Ltd.,15 1 in which the court ultimately de-
cided that the matter was governed exclusively by the
Convention and that because the United States was not an ap-
propriate fora for the lawsuit the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 151
In Weiss v. American Airlines, Inc., the defendant, American Air-
lines, had removed the personal injury lawsuit to federal court
and then sought dismissal under the preemptive effects of Tseng
1,15 Id. at 309-12.
1,46 In reAir Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
147 Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (2000).
148 In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
149 Exec. jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
150 In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
151 Id.
15'! Id. at 1165.
153 Adjoyi v. Fed. Air Ltd., 137 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
54 Id. at 501-02.
2002] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
and Articles 17 and 24 of the Convention.1 55 In light of the
Montreal Protocol's changes to the definition of "willful miscon-
duct," as well as Tseng's interpretation of Article 25 of the Con-
vention, the court ruled that the plaintiff's "willful misconduct"
claims against American were expressly relegated to state law,
and as such that "[took] out of play the federal question on
which American has attempted to hang its removal hat." Be-
cause the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction it
remanded the matter to state court for further proceedings. 156
b. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue
At least one court also dealt extensively with questions of per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue under the Convention in 2001. In
Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia, plaintiff Joyce Coyle brought a
lawsuit against defendant PT Garuda Indonesia (doing business
as Garuda Indonesia Airlines) ("Garuda"), a company wholly
owned by the government of Indonesia, arising out of the death
of her parents, who died in a 1997 crash of a Garuda passenger
aircraft. 157 Garuda moved to dismiss the action, or in the alter-
native for summary judgment, on several grounds, including
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Garuda and that
Oregon was not a permissible venue.
In response to Garuda's argument that it was not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Oregon, the court cited Article 28(1) of
the Convention, which it construed as a forum selection
clause. 58 The court then noted that the clause, created by inter-
national treaty rather than by contract, severely restricts the
range of permissible forums in light of this restriction, and
therefore the airline necessarily consents to personal jurisdic-
tion at those locations specified in Article 28(1).
With respect to the question of venue, the court observed that
most courts have considered Article 28(1) to be concerned with
jurisdiction only at the national level, and that domestic law
155 Weiss v. American Airlines, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
156 Id.
157 Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Or. 2001).
158 Article 28(1) provides:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plain-
tiff, in the territory of one of the high-contracting parties, either
before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal
place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court in the place
of destination.
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must then be applied to determine the proper forum within a
particular country. Then, the court conducted a venue analysis
and determined that Oregon was an appropriate venue for the
matter since the victims were Oregon residents, the tickets for
the trips were purchased in Oregon from an Oregon travel
agent, and Oregon was the passengers' place of departure and
intended final destination.
5. Damages Under the Convention
The court squarely addressed whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion allows recovery of punitive damages, as well as damages for
pre-impact emotional distress, in In re Air Crash Off Point
Mugu. 59 Here, the parties agreed that the Convention applied;
therefore, the first question in dispute was whether the Conven-
tion permits awards of punitive damages. 6 ' Although the Ninth
Circuit had not yet decided the point, the lower court felt that
the overwhelming body of law from other circuits clearly man-
dated that the Convention limit the right to recover from a car-
rier to compensatory damages and therefore does not include
punitive damages. 6 '
Defendant Alaska Airlines further argued that under Floyd
and Tseng the Convention precludes claims for purely emotional
distress,'1 2 so the plaintiffs' claims for pre-impact terror must
also be denied."" Plaintiffs responded that the violent maneu-
vering of the aircraft approximately one-half hour before the
crash caused physical injuries that predicated their emotional
injury claims. In the context of a motion for summary judgment
on the pleadings, the court ruled that the complaint contained
sufficient allegations to withstand the defendant's motion at that
time. "'
Other 2001 cases already discussed that also touched on emo-
tional injury damages include Carey v. United Airlines, Inc.," 5 Mc-
15,1 In reAir Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
Id. at 1161.
'I ld. at 1161-62.
162 See the discussion on Carey and McCaskey, supra notes 85-107 and accompa-
nying text.
'63 In reAir Crash Off Point Mugu, t45 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
16,1 Id. at 1163.
165 Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 255 F.3d 1044, 1051-54 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Caskey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,' Turturro v. Continental
Airlines,'67 and D'Alessandro v. American Airlines, Inc.' 8
6. Lost or Damaged Baggage
In Cruz v. American Airlines, Inc., the court addressed a num-
ber of issues-including class certification, contract issues of re-
scission for mistake and misrepresentation, the availability of
injunctive relief, the retroactivity of the Montreal Protocols, and
the Convention's subsequent rules with regard to an air carrier's
liability for lost luggage. The court ruled on a motion for class
certification and cross motions for summary judgment arising
out of three separate instances of lost baggage by three different
groups of plaintiffs, and addressed the cross motions for sum-
mary judgment.169
Initially, the court looked to a set of plaintiffs whose luggage
was lost by American but who had subsequently accepted pay-
ments and signed releases from American for that baggage.
These plaintiffs asserted that the releases should be set aside,
because American obtained them by misrepresentation and mis-
take. The court conducted a choice-of-law analysis and deter-
mined that the laws of Virginia, Maryland and Indiana applied
to each of the plaintiffs, respectively. 7" The court extensively
reviewed the rules with respect to rescission for mistake and mis-
representation and ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had
not met their burden of proof, thus American Airlines was
granted summary judgment as to the plaintiffs who had signed
releases.' 7
The court then moved to the original complaint of the plain-
tiffs that had not previously signed any type of release with
American. These plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against
American Airlines with respect to American's rule requiring no-
tice of lost luggage within 30 days of the incident. Deciding that
the plaintiffs lacked standing because the potential future dam-
166 McCaskey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 575-77 (S.D.
Tex. 2001).
167 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 175-79 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
168 D'Alessandro v. American Airlines, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307-12
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
169 Cruz v. American Airlines, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 103, 107-10 (D.D.C. 2001).
170 Id. at 112-13.
171 Id. at 114-17.
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age was simply too speculative and remote, the court granted
American summary judgment on this point as well. 7 2
The court then turned to the issue of American Airlines' lia-
bility for lost baggage under the Convention. Here the court
actually revisited this issue. The court had previously ruled that
although American was liable, the Convention limited its liabil-
ity to approximately half the amount that the plaintiffs were
seeking from American. 173 On appeal, the circuit court for the
D.C. circuit disagreed, ruling that the Warsaw Convention of-
fered no such protection to American.
Moreover, the circuit court ruled that the Montreal Protocol
No. 4 did not have the retroactive effect as American urged.
Nonetheless, American attempted to craft its retroactivity argu-
ment in the form of the abatement doctrine. After analyzing
the issue under applicable case law, the Montreal protocol for
itself, and the comments of the circuit court on the earlier ap-
peal of the same matter, the district court concluded that abate-
ment did not apply to the present circumstances. 74
Finally, the only claim that remained was the first plaintiffs'
claims for additional damages for their lost luggage. As such,
the question of class certification became moot, and that motion
was denied. 175
Another case addressing air carrier liability for lost or dam-
aged baggage under the Convention was Ijedinma v. Northwest
Airlines.176 Here the carrier required plaintiff Odinma Ijedinma
to check three excess bags on a trip from New Orleans, Louisi-
ana, to Lagos, Nigeria, with several stops in between. Ijedinma
filed suit when two of the bags did not arrive at her destination
and the carrier tendered an amount that she considered insuffi-
cient for the lost items. 17 7
Because the plaintiff did not dispute that the defendant air
carriers had complied with the Warsaw Convention's require-
ments with respect to the baggage, the only remaining question
lay in Ijedinma's assertion that the Convention did not apply
because the luggage was lost on the ground and not while the
172 Id. at 118-20.
173 Id. at 121.
174 Id. at 122.
175 Id. at 123.
176 Ijedinma v. Northwest Airlines, Civ. No. 00-1492 § "K"(5), 2001 WL 803745,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10412 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001).
177 jedinma, 2001 WL 803745, at *1.
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flight was airborne. 17a The court quickly determined that the
Convention defines "transportation by air" as that period during
which the carrier is in charge of the baggage. Accordingly, the
court ruled that the Convention applied, the air carriers could
avail themselves of the Convention's limits on liability (which
had already been tendered), and granted summary judgment
for the defendants.1 79
7. Lost or Damaged Cargo
In 2001, the Second Circuit extensively analyzed air carrier
liability under the Convention for lost or damaged cargo in
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp. 'b" The court analyzed the arti-
cles in the Convention that limit liability for the carriage of bag-
gage, as well as the potential modification of those articles by
the "Hague Protocol."'1 81
The case began when plaintiff-appellee Fujitsu Limited
("Fujitsu") shipped a container of silicon wafers from Narita, Ja-
pan, to Austin, Texas, using defendant-appellant Federal Ex-
press ("FedEx") as the cargo carrier. An air waybill
accompanied the container. After the container arrived in Aus-
tin, it was placed in a bonded-cargo cage to await clearance
through Customs. Before the package had cleared Customs and
been released to the cosignee, the cosignee faxed a notification
to FedEx that it was rejecting the shipment. FedEx then con-
tacted Fujitsu to determine what to do with the cargo. FedEx
policy provided that cargo refused by the consignee would not
be moved without written instructions and a guarantee of
payment.8 2
The evidence at trial indicated that Fujitsu orally instructed
FedEx to return the goods to Japan, and that the consignee pro-
vided written instructions also directing FedEx to return the
merchandise to Fujitsu at the consignee's expense. FedEx re-
labeled the goods and began to send them back to Fujitsu via
FedEx's hub in Memphis. FedEx did not create an air waybill in
Austin, but it did do so in Memphis. Although the goods appar-
178 Id. at *2-3.
179 Id.
180 Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 891 (2001).
181 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to the International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12, Oct. 1929,
Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 ("Warsaw Convention").
182 Fujitsu, 247 F.3d at 426-27.
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ently left Austin in good condition, they sat in Memphis for a
week before being shipped back to Japan. When they arrived in
Japan, Fujitsu observed that the outer container was broken and
covered with an oily substance which had leaked into some of
the interior boxes. Fujitsu immediately reported the damage to
FedEx, and FedEx eventually acknowledged that the damage oc-
curred to the container while it was in its possession. Fujitsu
subsequently destroyed or disposed of the wafers in the
container at the directions of its insurance carrier. 83
Fujitsu then brought its action against FedEx grounded in
breach of contract and negligence. FedEx responded that
FedEx had shipped the cargo with a proper air waybill and it was
thus entitled to a limitation on liability under the Warsaw Con-
vention of $9.07 per pound, for a total of $1,200 for the entire
shipment.
The lower court found, however, that the air waybill created
in Memphis did not comply with the requirements of the Con-
vention and that the shipment from Austin to Japan could not
be covered by the original air waybill. As such, the bench trial
awarded damages to Fujitsu in the amount of $726,640. FedEx
appealed, claiming (1) that the trial court erred in finding that
the return shipment was not covered by the original air way bill,
(2) that the Hague Protocol amendment to the Warsaw Conven-
tion was not applicable to the present case, (3) that the court's
findings with respect to damages were incorrect, and (4) that
the court erred in denying FedEx's request for a finding of spo-
liation relating to Fujitsu's destruction of the container and
wafers. '84
The circuit court began its analysis by reviewing the articles of
the Warsaw Convention that govern the shipment of cargo. Spe-
cifically, the court focused on Article 9 of the Convention, which
provides that if the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill,
or if the air waybill does not contain all the particulars set out in
Article 8 of the Convention, then the carrier is not entitled to
avail itself of the liability limitation provisions in the
Convention.' 85
FedEx asserted, however, that the shipment from Austin to
Japan was simply a return shipment under Article 12 to the Con-
vention rather than a new shipment that would require an
1- Id. at 427.
184 Id.
'M5 Id. at 429.
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amended or second air waybill for the return. However, the
court noted that Article 12 does not address whether the issu-
ance of a second or amended air waybill is required when the
cosignor orders the carrier to return the goods to the airport of
departure. In light of this difference, the appellate court agreed
with the lower court that Article 12 did not apply. Instead, the
court characterized the shipment as a new contract of carriage
that required a separate air waybill. Because a new air waybill
was not created in Austin for the return of the goods to Japan,
the appellate court agreed with the lower court that FedEx was
not entitled to the Convention's limited liability protection.86
The court then turned to FedEx's contention that the original
Warsaw Convention did not cover the case at hand, but rather
by the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Hague Protocol
covered the case. Similar to American Airlines' abatement argu-
ment as discussed above in the Cruz opinion, FedEx here argued
that the Hague protocol effectively abated the operation of the
provisions of the original Warsaw Convention. Accordingly,
FedEx could avail itself of the liability limitations of the Conven-
tion under the terms as amended by the Hague Protocol.
Fujitsu responded that applying the Hague Protocol to facts that
took place almost two years before the agreement's entry into
force for the United States would conflict with the circuit court's
earlier opinion in Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines,'87 which
held that the Hague Protocol should not be given retroactive
effect. 188
FedEx was not arguing that the Hague Protocol should be
given retroactive effect; rather it was arguing that the original
Warsaw Convention could not be prospectively enforced follow-
ing the Hague Protocol's entry into force. Under the common
law doctrine of abatement, a court has no power to enforce in-
choate rights or imperfect obligations under statutes that had
been repealed or amended but not explicitly saved or preserved
at the time of the amendment. Essentially, FedEx was arguing
that the Hague Protocol should be given effect as if it had always
been in place rather than the original Warsaw Convention.' 89
After analyzing FedEx's "enticing argument" at some length,
the court decided that it suffered from one crucial flaw-that
186 Id. at 430-31.
187 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 533 U.S.928 (2001).
188 Fujitsu, 247 F.3d at 431.
189 Id. at 431-32.
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the issue of whether the provision of a treaty has been abated or
following the entry into force of a subsequent treaty is not gov-
erned by the common law doctrine of abatement nor the gen-
eral savings statute codified at 1 U.S.C. § 109. "Rather, when
resolving that question, we apply the rules of customary interna-
tional law enunciated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties." '90
Moreover, under Article 59 to the Vienna Convention, an in-
ternational agreement is deemed to have been "terminated" by
conclusion of a later treaty only if all of the parties to the first
agreement conclude a later agreement relating to the subject
matter, and if the parties either intended that the matter should
be governed by the later treaty or the provisions of the later
treaty are so far incompatible with the earlier one that they are
not compatible being applied at the same time. 9' In applying
this rule to the matter at hand, the court determined that, "[b]y
giving effect to the original Warsaw Convention for conduct tak-
ing place before entry into force of the Hague protocol and ef-
fect to the Hague protocol for conduct taking place after entry
into force of that agreement, we easily avoid any possible incon-
sistency between the two agreements."' 19 2 As such, the court de-
termined that the terms of the original Warsaw Convention
applied to the claims asserted against FedEx and that the lower
court's ruling on this point was therefore appropriate.' 93
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois considered a similar issue in Fireman's Fund Insurance v.
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. 94 This case arose out of a lost carton of
communications equipment. Although the carrier admitted lia-
bility, the parties disputed whether the damages were limited
under the Convention.'95 The court ultimately found that the
air carrier had failed to include a stop in Amsterdam as an
"agreed stopping place" within the meaning of the applicable
articles of the Convention, and as such the air carrier could not
limit its liability to the plaintiff.'9 6 The court also ruled that it
190 Id. at 433 (citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (May 23, 1969) ("Vienna Convention")).
'1' Id. at 434.
192 Id.
193 Id.
'94 Fireman's Fund Ins. v. El A] Israel Airlines, Ltd., No. 99 C 3801, 2001 WL
32847, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2001).
'15 Fireman's Fund, 2001 WL 32847, at *3-5.
19I Id. at *6-14.
1144
2002] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
would not retroactively apply the Montreal Protocols, which had
changed the substantive requirements under the Convention
that were applicable to the matter at hand.'97
B. NON-WARSAW LIABILITfY OF AIR CARRIERS,
OPERATORS AND THIRD PARTIES
1. Air Carriers and Aircraft Owners or Operators
The court discussed issues of general negligence regarding
aircraft owners and operators in Craig Test Boring Co., Inc. v.
Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp.""8 This case arose out of a collision
between a Saudi Arabian Airlines ("Saudi") aircraft and a drill-
ing rig leased and operated by plaintiff Craig Test Boring Com-
pany ("Craig") while maintenance person taxied the aircraft on
a taxiway at JFK International Airport. A driller working for
Craig, who was accompanied by a representative of the airport,
had set up a drilling rig next to an active taxiway. Although the
airport would normally close a taxiway for such drilling opera-
tions, the agent had failed to do so. Moreover, safety cones had
not been placed on the taxiway near the drilling rig. Because
the taxiway was not closed, the mechanic working for Saudi was
cleared to taxi down the taxiway.
As he approached the rig, the mechanic believed that the
wing of the aircraft would clear the rig by passing both over and
to the left of the rig boom. Although the mechanic observed at
least one individual running away from the rig and another per-
son waving at the aircraft shortly before the crash, the mechanic
did not stop. The wingtip of the aircraft, a Boeing 747, collided
with the rig, causing substantial damage to both the aircraft and
the rig. Craig, Saudi, the airport and the applicable insurance
parties all sued each other based upon theories of general
negligence.1 99
Applying the law of New York State, as stipulated by the par-
ties, the court held a non-jury trial to resolve issues of negli-
gence, comparative negligence, and liability with respect to each
of the parties. At the end of the day, the court found that Saudi
was liable to Craig for 50% of Craig's damages plus interest, that
the airport was liable to Craig for 49% of Craig's damages plus
interest, that the airport was liable to Saudi for 49% of Saudi's
197 Id. at *14-15.
198 Craig Test Boring Co., Inc. v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 138 F. Supp. 2d
553 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
199 Id. at 555-57.
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damages plus interest, and finally that Craig was liable to Saudi
for 1% of Saudi's damages plus interest.2 ° 1
It is also interesting to note that the court, with respect to the
liability facing Saudi, adopted the requirements from 14 C.F.R.
§§ 91.3, 91.9, and 91.13 in order to set the standard of care as
applicable to Saudi's mechanic who was taxied the aircraft. Be-
cause the court found that the mechanic did not exercise any of
the various options available to him for the safe taxiing of the
aircraft, the court ruled that the mechanic, and hence Saudi,
had breached the appropriate standard of care. 2°j
Note from the Editor: The author recognizes the change in opinion,
but thought it appropriate to leave the original paper intact as it was
presented at the SMU Air Law Symposium and highlight the change to
the reader through an editor's note.
In the case of Malone v. Capital Correctional Resources, Inc., the
Supreme Court of Mississippi had to decide whether under that
state's laws the owner of an aircraft could be held vicariously
liable for the negligence of a non-employee pilot who borrowed
the aircraft for the benefit of his personal friends.2 °2 Plaintiffs
argued that the applicable state statutes had been interpreted by
both the state and federal courts as meaning that the owner of
an aircraft is also an operator and is vicariously liable for all acts
of the pilot.2 :3
The lower court ruled, however, that plaintiffs supporting
cases were distinguishable from the case at hand, and the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court agreed. The court ruled that prior prece-
dent was distinguishable, that this was a case of first impression
from Mississippi courts, and as such that the plaintiffs' argu-
ments were insufficient to call into question the grant of sum-
mary judgment by the circuit court.2°14 It is worth noting that
the court went to great ends to distinguish the prior Fifth Cir-
cuit case of Hayes v. Morgan,205 which had interpreted the Missis-
sippi statutes as meaning that the owner of an aircraft is also an
operator and is vicariously liable for all acts of the pilot, noting
200 Id. at 557-62.
201 Id. at 558-59.
202 Malone v. Capital Corr. Res., Inc., No. 1999-CA-1451-SCT, 2001 WL 954157,
2001 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. S.Ct. Aug. 23, 2001), withdrawn, 808 So. 2d 963
(2001).
20 Malone, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 203, at *3-6.
204 Id. at *7-15.
205 Hayes v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).
1146
2002] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
that the Fifth Circuit had itself moved away from that ruling, as
well as had other federal circuit and district courts.
20 6
In Jarmuth v. Aldridge, the Illinois court of appeals addressed
negligence claims arising out of the crash of a World War II vin-
tage Vultee BT 13-A training aircraft that was owned by the de-
fendants and piloted by the decedent.207 The aircraft developed
a fuel leak, and the owners turned it over to an FAA certificated
mechanic for repair. Three days after the airplane was repaired
and certified as airworthy, it crashed while the decedent was fly-
ing it to Oshkosh, Wisconsin, where it was to be sold.208
The plaintiff asserted that the owner-defendants had a non-
delegable duty to ensure that the aircraft was airworthy, that the
defendants had breached this duty when they failed to person-
ally inspect the aircraft after it had already been inspected by an
FAA-certified mechanic, and that this failure to inspect in turn
caused the death of decedent since a defect in the aircraft fuel
system caused the aircraft to crash. As framed by the court, the
issue was whether the facts and the law create a duty to ensure
that an aircraft is airworthy that can not be delegated to
another.2 °9
In analyzing this issue, the court compared the maintenance
requirements found in 14 C.F.R. Part 121, applicable to com-
mercial air carriers, with the general maintenance requirements
found in 14 C.F.R. Part 91. The court noted that 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.363 imposes upon a certificated air carrier a nondelegable
duty to be responsible for all repairs made to the aircraft, while
§§ 91.403 and 91.406, which apply to noncommercial aircraft
owners, speak only in terms of "primary responsibility." The
court took the use of the term "primary responsibility" to mean
that there could also be "secondary responsibility," in turn ne-
gating the implication that the owner's duty under the general
aviation rules is completely nondelegable. 21 0 The court con-
cluded that because there was no evidence that the
owner-defendants were negligent in relying on properly-certi-
fied FAA mechanics to perform the repair work, and because
there was no evidence that the owner-defendants had actual or
constructive knowledge of any defect in the aircraft, the owners
206 Malone, 2001 Miss. LEXIS, at *11-13.
207 Jarmuth v. Aldridge, 747 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ill. Ct. App. 2001).
208 Id. at 1016-17.
209 Id. at 1017.
210 Id. at 1018.
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could not be held liable for the negligence, if any, of the
mechanics.21'
2. Airports
Several courts also addressed the liability facing the operators
of airports in 2001. For example, in Walsh v. Avalon Aviation,
Inc., the federal district court addressed whether a private air-
port can be liable for a pilot's collision with obstructions beyond
the airport boundary during a failed takeoff attempt.2 1 2 The
matter appeared to be one of first impression for the court
under Maryland law, so it conducted an extensive analysis of the
various Federal Aviation Administration regulatory require-
ments applicable to airports.
As part of this analysis, the court noted the distinction be-
tween regulations addressing obstructions to runway approach
paths and the lack of similar requirements with respect to run-
way departure paths.213 Finding that no regulatory requirement
was violated, the court then turned to the question of reasona-
bleness under a basic negligence analysis. Applying the facts at
hand, the court determined that the airport did not act unrea-
sonably, thus its motion for summary judgment against the
plaintiff was warranted.214
The Supreme Court of South Dakota considered the question
of whether an airport owed a duty of reasonable care with re-
gard to providing small aircraft tie-down ropes in the case of
Pierce v. City of Belle Fourche.21 5 Here, the court noted that under
South Dakota law the possessor of land owes a business invitee a
duty of reasonable care. Moreover, the duty extends to fixtures,
attachments and appliances used on land. The court ruled that
tie-down ropes are such appliances and that, if such a duty of
reasonable care exists, it extends not only to the business invi-
tee's person but also to the business invitee's personal
property.211
Moreover, the court determined that it would be foreseeable
that airplanes would land at the airport, that tie down ropes
would eventually wear out from use and exposure to the ele-
ments, and that if such worn-out rope broke during high winds,
211 Id. at 1019.
212 Walsh v. Avalon Aviation, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 726 (D. Md. 2001).
213 Id. at 728.
214 Id. at 729-30.
215 Pierce v. City of Belle Fourche, 624 N.W.2d 353 (S.D. 2001).
216 Id. at 355.
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an airplane could be damaged or even blow away. Conse-
quently, the defendant city had a duty to use reasonable care in
selecting the ropes, fabricating the tie-downs and detecting and
replacing the worn tie-downs. The supreme court therefore
ruled the trial court erred in determining that the city did not
owe the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care and reversed and re-
manded the case for trial on the merits.217
3. Non-Aviation-Industry Third Party Liabilities
In Craig Test Boring Co., Inc. v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., dis-
cussed at length above, the trial court ruled that non-aviation-
industry third parties could be held liable under the theory of
negligence with respect an aircraft accident.2 8 Several other
courts also investigated such third-party negligence liability in
2001. For example, in Rachel v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., the dis-
trict court ruled that in a passenger's personal injury action
against an air taxi operator arising from the crash of one of its
helicopters, the aircraft operator could not file a third party
complaint against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective
prosthetic implant used in the treatment of one of the passen-
ger's injuries.219 This was because under the state's comparative
negligence statute, the proper method for the operator to be
indemnified was through operation of that statute rather than a
separate third-party action directly against the manufacturer.
On the other hand, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled in
Hosto v. Union Electric Co. that an electric utility company could
be held liable for an accident in which a helicopter crashed into
one of its unmarked power lines, killing the pilot and passen-
ger.220 This was so, even though the power lines were not re-
quired to be marked under the applicable federal aviation
regulations, because they spanned 1,300 feet across a river and
had oxidized to a point where they were virtually impossible for
a pilot to see. Moreover, the lines in question were in close
proximity to two airports, over 40 airports were located in the
general area, and the particular river was a "natural flyway" with
heavy boat traffic.221
217 Id. at 356-57.
218 Craig Test Boring Co., Inc. v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 138 F. Supp. 2d
553 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See supra notes 198-201 for the discussion of the case.
219 Rachel v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 99-3205 § "N," 2001 WL
699415, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8576 (E.D. La. June 19, 2001).
220 Hosto v. Union Elec. Co., 51 S.W.3d 133 (Mo. App. 2001).
221 Id. at 139-41.
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C. LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS
1. No Manufacturer's Liability Regarding Inaccurate Fuel Gage
In McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard the appeal from
final judgment against an aircraft-manufacturer defendant find-
ing that it was partially liable, based on a faulty fuel gage, for the
crash of a helicopter being used in "slinging" operations.222
Slinging involves the suspension of a heavy load from a heli-
copter using equipment attached to the helicopter for that pur-
pose. The helicopter then transports the load to a different
location while flying at low altitudes. Moreover, given the lim-
ited weight-carrying capacity of the helicopters used for slinging
operations, helicopter pilots slinging loads are often required to
fly with lower quantities of fuel than helicopters engaged in
other operations. During this particular series of slinging opera-
tions, the plaintiff, Peter McLennan, crashed an American
Eurocopter Corporation Model AS-350-B helicopter near the
Haig Glacier in Western Alberta, Canada.223
The plaintiff contended that the aircraft manufacturer was re-
sponsible for his injuries and resulting damages under the Texas
law theories of strict products liability negligence. Both theories
focused upon alleged marketing defects in the helicopter. Spe-
cifically, the plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer affirma-
tively marketed the helicopter as suitable for slinging operations
when in fact the helicopter was unreasonably dangerous for that
use. These allegations were based in part upon plaintiffs asser-
tion that the resistor-type fuel measurement system in the air-
craft tended to wear when consistently flown in the low-fuel
stage required for slinging, which led to inaccurate fuel gauge
readings. In essence, the plaintiff claimed that any helicopter
equipped with such a resistor-type fuel measurement system is
unreasonably dangerous and should not be used for slinging
operations. 94
The manufacturer responded that: (1) the helicopter was not
unreasonably dangerous; (2) it owed no duty to warn users of
any risk under the circumstances of the plaintiffs flight; (3)
even if there was such a duty, it was completely satisfied by the
issuance of service letters and bulletins before the crash address-
222 McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2001).
22:' Id. at 409-14.
224 Id. at 422-23, 427.
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ing issues with respect to the fuel measurement system; (4) the
alleged marketing defects were neither the producing nor prox-
imate causes of the crash; and (5) the crash was caused instead
by the improper maintenance or pilot error or both.225
Based on these allegations, the circuit court conducted an ex-
tensive review of the facts introduced at trial. The circuit court
disagreed with essentially all of the trial court's conclusions.
The court found that the plaintiff had ignored the documentary
warnings provided by the manufacturer in flight documentation
and service letters and bulletins regarding the fuel measure-
ment system. Further, the court found that he ignored the
warnings given to him by instructor pilots on the aircraft and
ignored warnings provided by the aircraft itself. The court also
found that he continued to fly the aircraft with the low fuel
warning light on in violation of the flight manual and company
policy, and he commenced at least two additional sling loads
with knowledge that he was within 20 minutes of his fuel reserve.
In short, the court concluded that there were no additional
warnings that the manufacturer could have given that would
have dissuaded the plaintiff from continuing his flight on the
day of the crash.
In the end, the circuit court ruled that the district court had
"committed clear error, and that the record does not support
the conclusion that [manufacturer's] conduct was either a pro-
ducing or proximate cause of this crash. To the contrary, this
crash was caused solely by [plaintiffs] own pilot error. ''22 ' The
court reversed and remanded in favor of the manufacturer and
ruled that plaintiffs cross-appeal with respect to the percentage
of liability was moot.
2. The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994
The contours of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994 ("GARA") 227 were further defined by two cases in 2001.
Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A. settled several open issues about GARA 228
In Lyon, three individuals were killed in the crash of a Marchetti
model F-260 aircraft on November 26, 1993. The aircraft had
been sold originally by Marchetti in December of 1970 to SA
225 Id. at 427-34.
226 Id. at 434.
227 The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108
Stat. 1552 (1994), reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 40101, notes.
228 Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1079 (2002).
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Sabena, NV in Belgium and had, after intervening transfers, be-
come the property of the owner of the craft at the time of the
crash. The decedent's survivors brought a lawsuit against
Marchetti and its parent corporations on November 15, 1994.
The effective date of GARA was August 17, 1994. The defendant
manufacturers moved to dismiss the lawsuits on the basis that it
was barred by the provisions of GARA. The district court
granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 29
On appeal, the decedent's survivors argued that GARA did
not properly cover their cause of action because the accident in
question occurred before GARA was enacted. They added that
if GARA did cover their cause of action, then it is unconstitu-
tional. The Ninth Circuit analyzed both the retroactivity and
constitutionality claims.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the retroactivity ques-
tion by noting that the Supreme Court has made it clear that,
with some notable exceptions, retroactive legislation is permissi-
ble. The normal presumption is that statutes are not meant to
be retroactive. Moreover, if Congress has expressly prescribed
the statute's proper reach, then there is no need to resort to
judicial default rules. But if Congress does not clearly set the
statute's reach, the Court must go on to ask whether the new
statute would have a retroactive effect. 22 3 0
The Court then turned to the text of GARA. Noting that the
Act states that it was to take effect on the date of its enactment,
August 17, 1994, and that this statement does not speak to retro-
activity, the Court then observed that preceding the declaration
is the phrase "except as provided in subsection (b) . " This
subsection in turn reads, "this Act shall not apply with respect to
civil actions commenced before the date of enactment of this
Act."23' In discussing this choice of language, the Court found
that Congress had clearly expressed its intention that GARA be
applied to all actions that had not already been commenced on
its effective date. Because the Court had ruled that GARA
should be applied retroactively, the Court then turned to plain-
tiff's claims that the Act is unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs urged that if GARA barred their action, then it is
unconstitutional both substantively and procedurally. 23 2 The
221) Id. at 1081.
230 Id. at 1084-85.
231 1i. at 1085 (citing GARA § 4(b)).
232 Id. at 1085-86.
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plaintiffs' substantive argument rested on the theory that GARA
deprived them of a vested property right in their cause of action.
The Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed this argument, noting that
it had previously held that although a cause of action is a species
of property, that party's property right in any cause of action
does not vest until the party obtains a final, reviewable
judgment.233
Plaintiffs also claimed that GARA violated a procedural due
process right, because the statute of limitations cannot be short-
ened in a way that eliminates the plaintiffs ability to file an ac-
tion. Still, the Court held that GARA is not a statute of
limitations, and it does not shorten any statute of limitations.
Rather, GARA is "a classic statute of repose. 2 34 As the Court
explained, a statute of repose does not run from the dates on
which the injury occurs. Rather, it runs from what amounts to
the date of the first transfer from the manufacturer.
With this in mind, the Court analyzed of the legislative history
of this statute, with a special focus on whether Congress acted
irrationally or arbitrarily in passing the statute. The Court even-
tually concluded that "Congress rationally can, and did, offer
special protection to those who had already filed their actions.
That is not irrational. GARA is constitutional in this respect.
235
Therefore, the Court concluded that because Marchetti first de-
livered the aircraft in question approximately twenty-three years
before its crash in California, GARA constitutionally barred an
action based upon that accident even though GARA itself was
not passed until after the accident occurred.2 3"
In Bain v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., the court decided whether Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc. ("Bell"), the manufacturer of the heli-
copter that gave rise to the lawsuit, could be liable to plaintiffs
due to GARA.23 7 Finding that Bell had delivered the helicopter
more than twenty-eight years before the crash, that it did not
replace or work on the parts of the aircraft relevant to the crash
since the original delivery, and that it had no reason to monitor
or issue warnings concerning the aircraft parts in question, the
court held that GARA barred all of the state law causes of action
plaintiffs had asserted against Bell and dismissed Bell from the
233 Id. at 1086.
234 Id. at 1084, 1086.
235 Id. at 1086-88.
236 Id. at 1089.
237 Bain v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 932 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
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suit.2 3 8 Moreover, the court found that because there was no
possibility of recovery against Bell under GARA, plaintiffs had
fraudulently joined Bell in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction
and therefore denied plaintiffs' motion to remand. 211
3. The Economic Loss or East River Doctrine
In Brown v. Eurocopter, S.A., a federal district court in the Fifth
Circuit addressed defendants Eurocopter, S.A.'s and American
Eurocopter Corp.'s (together "Eurocopter") Rule 12(b) (6) mo-
tion to dismiss the counter-plaintiffs' suit for failure to state a
claim."" The case arose out of the crash of a Eurocopter heli-
copter in which the aircraft lost tail-rotor control and struck an
off-shore oil platform, killing its pilot.
The decedent's survivors filed suit against Eurocopter, which
in turn filed a third-party suit against the air taxi operator that
owned and operated the aircraft. The air taxi operator filed
counter-claims against Eurocopter, based on Eurocopter's al-
leged post-sale negligent acts, for the damage to the aircraft
caused by the crash. Hence Eurocopter's motion to dismiss as-
serting that the economic loss or East River doctrine-the doc-
trine under maritime law that no cause of action sounding in
strict liability or negligence is allowed for damages that a prod-
uct causes to itself-effectively barred any recovery by the air
taxi operator against Eurocopter. 241
In response, the air taxi operator agreed that the East River
doctrine did not apply to cases involving post-sale negligence, as
opposed to negligence occurring prior to or at the time of sale.
The court then noted that the circuits are split on the issue, with
the Eleventh Circuit holding that a claim for post-sale negli-
gence is not barred by the doctrine, the Third Circuit holding
that such a claim is barred by the doctrine, and the Fifth Circuit
not yet weighing in on the issue. In light of the lack of guidance
from its own circuit, the district court followed the Eleventh Cir-
cuit and ruled that the East River doctrine did not bar the air
taxi operator's claims. Therefore, the court denied
Eurocopter's motion to dismiss. 24 2
238 Id. at 934-36, 940.
239 Id. at 936-38, 940.
240 Brown v. Eurocopter, S.A., 143 F. Supp. 2d 781 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
2,1 /d. at 782.
2,12 1d. at 783.
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Finally, in Voohries-Larson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the administra-
tors of three airplane crash decedents filed liability and wrong-
ful death claims against Cessna Aircraft Co. 243 Ruling on the
appeal of the trial court's judgment on a jury verdict, the circuit
court held the administrators have failed to preserve for review
objections to certain jury instructions and that the evidence sup-
ported the verdict, thus affirming the lower courts decision.244
D. LIABILITrY OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
During 2001, two courts addressed the scope of the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). First, the Second Circuit extended
subject matter jurisdiction to federal district courts where 49
U.S.C. § 46110 could have arguably denied jurisdiction. Sec-
ond, a federal district court held that the FTCA does not waive
sovereign immunity in claims by federal contractors.
The case of Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc. is part of a tortured history
surrounding the crash of a Shuttle, Inc. aircraft in June 1996
and the FAA's emergency revocation of the aircraft captain's-
Richard Merritt's-pilot certificate as a result of that crash.245
Merritt appealed the FAA's emergency revocation to the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ"), who after a four day hearing modified the
revocation to a nine month suspension. This modification was
based in large part on the ALJ's finding that the FAA had failed
to provide Merritt with all of the weather information the FAA
controllers were aware of that contributed to the crash.24"
Merritt initially appealed the ALJ's order to the NTSB, but he
soon abandoned the appeal and filed an action in federal dis-
trict court. Merritt filed numerous federal and state claims
against several defendants, including a Fifth Amendment due
process Bivens claim against three FAA officials, and an FTCA
negligence claim against the United States based on the FAA's
failure to warn Merritt of the approaching storm. The defend-
ants originally moved to dismiss on various grounds. The dis-
trict court granted a number of these motions, and denied the
balance. Among the motions denied was the United States' mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 49
243 Voohries-Larson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 241 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 2001).
244 Id. at 710-19.
245 Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 245 F.3d 182, 184-86 (2d Cir. 2001).
246 Id. at 185.
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U.S.C. § 46110 and the FAA officials' motion to dismiss the
Bivins claims on qualified immunity grounds.247
Although the FAA officials raised an interlocutory appeal of
the district court's rejection of their qualified immunity defense,
the circuit court instead reviewed sua sponte the district court's
denial of the United States' motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under § 46110. "Finding that Merritt's Biv-
ens claim was 'inescapably intertwined"' with review of the sus-
pension order, and that permitting that claim to proceed to trial
in the District Court "would result in new adjudication over the
evidence and testimony adduced in the prior administrative...
hearing, the creditability determinations made by the ALJ, and,
ultimately, the findings made by the ALJ during the course of
the proceedings under § 46110," the circuit court concluded
that "§ 46110 deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the
Bivins claim. ''24 ' The court then remanded the action to the dis-
trict court for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
On remand, the district court dismissed the Fifth Amendment
due process claims against the three FAA officials. Further-
more, finding that Merritt's common law tort actions against the
United States were "inescapably intertwined" with the NTSB
ALJ's original review of the revocation order, the district court
also sua sponte dismissed Merritt's FTCA claim against the
United States. Therefore, the present case is Merritt's timely ap-
peal of the district court's decision.249
To begin its analysis of whether § 46110 deprived the District
Court ofjurisdiction over Merritt's FTC claims, the circuit court
looked at the text of the statute itself. Section 496110 gives to
the Courts of Appeal for the United States the exclusive jurisdic-
tion to affirm, amend, modify or set aside FAA orders with re-
spect to pilot certificates.25 ° Thus, the section precludes a
federal district court from affirming, amending, modifying or
setting aside any part of such an order.
The Court then noted that under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, statutes such as
§ 46110 that vest judicial review of administrative orders exclu-
sively in a court of appeals also preclude district courts from
hearing claims that are "inescapably intertwined" with review of
247 Id. at 185-86.
241 Id. at 186.
24' Id.
2•50o Id. at 186-87.
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such orders.251 In reviewing the City of Tacoma decision at
length, the circuit court understood it to mean that such stat-
utes preclude: (1) de novo litigation of issues hearing in a contro-
versy over an administrative order where one party alleges that it
was aggrieved by the order, and (2) all other modes of judicial
review of the order. The court explained:
[T] his means that the mere overlap of evidence and testimony
introduced in the two proceedings, or the mere overlap of find-
ings made by an ALJ and by a district courtjudge, are insufficient
to preclude the district court from hearing a given claim. Such
overlap is relevant only if the claim attacks the matters decided
by the administrative order.252
Applied to the present case, the circuit court determined that
Merritt's FTCA claim did not allege that he was injured or ag-
grieved by the ALJ's suspension order. Instead, Merritt claimed
that he was injured by the failure of the FAA employees to pro-
vide him with accurate information prior to his takeoff in June
of 1996. Moreover, the Court noted that the substance of Mer-
ritt's claims went to issues that AL could not have decided, be-
cause such a venue is not appropriate for deciding, or providing
relief to Merritt for, any negligence of the FAA employees. 53
Finally, the circuit court also considered several issues that
weighed against depriving the district court of jurisdiction over
Merritt's FTCA claims. First, under the district court's reading,
although every passenger on board the crashed aircraft could
have brought an IFTCA claim against the government, Merritt
could not. Moreover, even if the ALJ had found that Merritt
bore no responsibility for the crash, Merritt would nonetheless
unjustly be barred from ever bringing an FTCA claim in the dis-
trict court. While this interpretation would preclude Merritt
from bringing an FTCA claim for injuries he suffered, it would
ironically permit Merritt's estate to bring an FTCA claim if Mer-
ritt actually died as a result of the crash. 54
Thus, the circuit court determined that § 46110 did not de-
prive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, and re-
manded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion.255
251 Id. at 187 (citing City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 336
(1958)).
252 Id. at 187-89.
253 Id. at 189-90.
254 Id. at 191.
255 Id. at 192.
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In Alinsky v. United States, a federal district court also ad-
dressed issues surrounding the FTCA.2 5" The case arose from
the crash of two aircraft over Chicago's Merrill C. Meigs Field in
July of 1997. At the time of the crash, the Air Traffic Control
Tower was operated by a private company acting as an indepen-
dent contractor for the FAA. The plaintiff's filed suit against the
FAA in part under the FTCA, seeking to hold the FAA vicari-
ously liable for the independent contractor's alleged negli-
gence. The district court quickly granted the government's
motion to dismiss this claim, because the waiver of sovereign im-
munity granted by the FTCA only extends to actions initiated by
government employees and not to those by independent
contractors.257
E. LIABILITY OF FoREIGN NATIONS: THE FoREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 258 (FSIA) is the exclu-
sive source of the United States courts' subject matter jurisdic-
tion over claims against foreign states and their agencies or
instrumentalities. Generally, the Act presumes that a foreign
state or instrumentality is immune from suit in federal court un-
less, among other things, the particular claim is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by that state
or instrumentality. Several courts that addressed these issues in
2001 found that there was insufficient U.S. commercial activity
to establish jurisdiction under FSIA.
1. Insufficient U.S. Commercial Activity to Establish Jurisdiction
For example, in Ryba v. Lot Polish Airlines, the two plaintiffs-a
husband and wife-sued Lot Polish Airlines-a company which
was majority owned by the Republic of Poland-for injuries the
wife sustained after she fell in an entranceway of a facility owned
by the defendant. 259 Upon finding no significant nexus between
the airline's commercial activity in the United States and the
plaintiffs' cause of action, the court dismissed the claims for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 211
256 Alinsky v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 2d 908 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
257 Id. at 911.
258 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq.
259 Ryba v. Lot Polish Airlines, No. 00 CIV. 5976, 2001 WL 286731, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2908 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001).
260 Ryba, 2001 WL 286731, at *1-3.
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Likewise, in Fondo v. Delta Airlines, Inc., plaintiff Edwin Fondo,
M.D., filed suit against defendants Delta Airlines, Inc. and Air
France, Inc., for their failure to transport him to Brazzaville, Af-
rica, and for various tortious acts.26 1 Defendant Air France
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under FSIA because there was
no identifiable nexus between the plaintiffs claims and defen-
dant's commercial activity in the United States. The court dis-
missed the claim finding that the only nexus between the
plaintiffs tort claims and Air France's commercial activity in the
U.S. was that the plaintiff had purchased his ticket here.262
2. Sufficient U.S. Commercial Activity to Establish Jurisdiction
On the other hand, at least one court found sufficient U.S.
commercial activity in order to establish jurisdiction against a
foreign instrumentality. In Lyon v. Augusta S.P.A., discussed at
length above with regard to GARA, the court first addressed the
question of whether the district court had jurisdiction under
FSIA over the foreign manufacturer.263 Marchetti, and the Au-
gusta entities that owned it, were instrumentalities of the Repub-
lic of Italy.264 All parties agreed that Marchetti's acts of
designing, manufacturing and selling the aircraft were "in con-
nection with the commercial activity" and that the activity was
"outside the territory of the United States," but the parties dis-
agreed as to whether that activity caused "a direct effect in the
United States. ' 26 5 Calling the concept of "a direct effect in the
United States" a rather "enigmatic proposition" to construe, the
circuit court then turned to previous Supreme Court precedent
to unravel this enigma.266
In looking to this case law, the court decided that the plain-
tiff's harm need not necessarily be a substantial, foreseeable or
immediate cause or result of an act of the defendant's acts
outside the United States; rather it only must be an immediate
consequence of defendant's activity. In turn, the court deter-
mined that of the phrase "immediate consequence" means that
the focus should be on whether some intervening act broke the
261 Fondo v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 2445 (JSM), 2001 WL 604039, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7098 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2001).
262 Fondo, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7098, at *13-16.
263 Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2001).
264 Id. at 1081.
265 Id. at 1082.
266 Id.
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chain of causation leading from the asserted wrongful act to its
impact in the United States.267 In light of this analysis, the cir-
cuit court determined under the facts of the case that the court
did have jurisdiction over Marchetti under the commercial activ-
ity exception to FSIA.268
3. Waiver of FSIA Immunity
In Coyle v. P. T Garuda Indonesia, another case discussed
above, the court ruled that the defendant air carrier had waived
its FSLA immunity when it obtained a permit from the DOT to
conduct operations between Indonesia and the United States
because that permit included a specific limited waiver of sover-
eign immunity.269
F. SELECTED MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION ISSUES
1. "Tseng Preemption" Blocks Causes of Action
Courts issued several opinions dealing with pending multi-dis-
trict litigation ("MDL") in 2001. In two cases the courts dealt
with exclusivity issues under the Tseng decision. In In re Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., Flight 869, the court indicated that the Warsaw
Convention does not apply in instances where a plaintiff pleads
"willful misconduct,"-a statement that directly conflicts with
the other cases discussed above on this point.27° The Flight 869
court also very briefly addressed several choice of substantive law
issues as part of its opinion.27'
In In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, the court also briefly touched
upon exclusivity issues with respect to the Convention and in
light of the Tseng decision. Then the court moved to the discus-
sion of damages available under the Convention as noted
above.272
267 Id. at 1083.
268 Id. at 1083-84.
269 Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia, Civ. No. 99-1348-JE, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9483 (D.Or. Apr. 30, 2001).
270 In reAmerican Airlines, Inc., Flight 869, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (S.D.
Fla. 2001).
271 Id. at 1370.
272 In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1161 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
1160
20021 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
2. Removal and Choice of Law Issues
In another pending MDL matter, In re Air Crash at Little Rock,
a parent and natural guardian of a minor sued American Air-
lines for loss of consortium with respect to the minor's father. 73
The court addressed a motion to remand the case. The father
was injured during the crash of American Airlines Flight 1420 at
Little Rock, and his case was pending with the Eastern District of
Arkansas, the court conducting the multi-district litigation for
this matter.274
The guardian originally filed suit in Dallas County, Texas then
the suit was conditionally transferred to the Arkansas court in
July of 2001. The plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to
Dallas County, because it had been improvidently removed. Al-
though American Airlines is based in Texas, the court ultimately
determined that the only proper venue for the child's consor-
tium claim was the Eastern District of Arkansas because the
claim for loss of consortium must be filed in conjunction with
the parents' pending action. Moreover, because there was no
other connection to Texas (all the parties were Colorado re-
sidents), and Colorado does not recognize the right of a child to
sue for loss of consortium as a result of injury to the parent, the
court also granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the loss of consortium claim. 75
G. PREEMPTION
A number of courts addressed a broad range of preemption
issues in 2001, including several cases applying the Airline Der-
egulation Act of 1978, preemption under various constitutional
provisions and the Pilot Record Improvements Act of 1996.
1. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978276 ("ADA") sets at a fed-
eral regulatory scheme for the airline industry. In many in-
stances, the ADA preempts state law. In 2001, courts settled
several issues surrounding the ADA's preemptive effects.
273 In reAir Crash at Little Rock, 170 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Ark. 2001).
274 Id. at 862.
275 Id. at 863.
276 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1970), Pub.
L. 96-192, 94 Stat. 48 (1980), and Pub. L. 103-429, 108 Stat. 4390 (1994) (re-
printed at various sections throughout 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101 et seq.).
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a. Justice O'Connor's Call to Settle Split Between the
Circuits
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor's dissented from the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Duncan.277
Justice O'Connor dissented because she felt that the case
"presents an important issue that has divided the Courts of Ap-
peals: the meaning of the term 'service' and the portion of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) that preempts any state
law 'related to any price, route, or service of an air carrier.' "278
Justice O'Connor began her comments by noting that although
the Court has addressed the scope of the ADA's preemption
provision on two occasions, it has never directly addressed the
definition of "service" within the meaning of 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b) (1).
The courts of appeals that have taken on this definition have
arrived at directly conflicting positions. For example, the Ninth
and Third Circuits have held that the term "service" encom-
passes the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the
point to point transportation of passengers, cargo or mail, but
does not encompass the provision of in flight beverages, per-
sonal assistance to passengers, the handling of luggage, and sim-
ilar amenities.279 On the other hand, the courts of appeals for
the Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have adopted a much
broader definition, holding that "service" does include actions
such as ticketing, boarding procedures, provisioning of food
and drink, and baggage handling.20 In light of these directly
conflicting interpretations, Justice O'Connor would have ac-
cepted certiorari on the case so that the Supreme Court could
settle the conflict.28 1
b. Municipal Authority Not Preempted and Can Enforce
Non-Discrimination Rules
The Ninth Circuit addressed ADA preemption of municipal
ordinances in Air Transportation Association of America v. City &
County of San Francisco.212 The City of San Francisco, through its
277 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Duncan, 531 U.S. 1058 (2000).
'278 Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
279 Id. (citations omitted).
28 ) Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
281 Id. at 572.
282 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 1064
(9th Cir. 2001).
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Airport Commission, owns and operates the San Francisco Inter-
national Airport. Since 1966, the city has refused as a matter of
public policy to do business with contractors that discriminate
on the basis of race and other identifying factors. In 1972, the
city amended its ordinances to add gender and sexual orienta-
tion as additional prohibited bases for discrimination. In 1997,
the city extended these prohibitions to contracting agencies of
the city, including the San Francisco International Airport.
Thus, in order to execute new airport property contracts or to
amend existing airport property contracts, airlines with a pres-
ence at the airport would have to provide benefits on an equal
basis to married employees and employees with registered do-
mestic partners. 28 3
Organizations representing the various airlines and affected
parties (together the "airlines") filed suit against the city alleg-
ing that the ADA preempted ordinances, among other things.28 4
The lower court held that ADA preemption rules required the
airlines to provide proof that "they or the members they re-
present are seriously considering not flying in or out of San
Francisco, or limiting or rejecting future business or expansion,
as a result of the burdens of complying with the ordinance. 285
The airlines failed to provide this proof. The Ninth Circuit con-
sidered this ruling on appeal.
On appeal, the airlines offered two arguments as to why the
district court's summary judgment in favor of the city regarding
preemption was in error. First, they argued that the ordinances'
requirement that contractors not discriminate in providing
"travel benefits" and "employee discounts" related to prices and
services. Second, they argued that the ordinances' method of
imposing the nondiscrimination requirements-conditioning
future airport property leases on compliance with the ordi-
nance-related to service and routes. 286
Looking to prior ADA precedent, the circuit court concluded
that the ordinances' requirements did not relate to prices or ser-
vices because the ordinance simply required the airlines not to
discriminate in providing benefits. It did not bind the airlines
to provide free or discounted tickets to anyone; rather it stated
that the if the airlines did provide tickets to employees' spouses,
283 Id. at 1069.
284 This group also alleged preemption under the Railway Labor Act, the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and California law.
285 Air Transp. Ass'n., 266 F.3d at 1070.
286 Id. at 1072-73.
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then they would also have to provide them to their registered
domestic partners. As such, the airlines were free to set
whatever terms, conditions and prices they wanted on the travel
benefits and discounts that they chose to provide, as long as they
did not discriminate. Therefore, the ADA did not preempt
these provisions.287
With respect to the airlines' second argument, the circuit
court felt that the method of imposing the ordinances did not
relate to routes and services. Rather, the city could impose the
ordinances through its role as landlord of the city airport under
either its sovereign power or its contractual power to impose
those restrictions. The court felt it was inconsequential that the
ordinance had the effect of inuring bargaining leverage to the
city because the ordinance only bound the airlines to nondis-
crimination, not to actually make changes in their prices, routes
or services.288 In summary, the circuit court concluded that the
ADA did not preempt the ordinance and affirmed the lower
court's decision on this point.
c. State Whistleblower Statute is Preempted by ADA
In Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota considered whether Minnesota's
whistleblower statute is both expressly preempted under the
ADA or impliedly preempted under the Wendell H. Ford Avia-
tion Investment and Reform Act.2 9 Specifically, the court con-
sidered whether the whistleblower statute, as applied to
plaintiff's claim alleging that she had been improperly fired for
reporting suspected violations of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions ("FARs"), amounted to enforcement of the law related an
air carrier's service.
Omni Air asserted that the plaintiffs claim was related to a
service, because the plaintiffs refusal to perform relied on her
understanding of the applicable FARs. Also, if an employee
could use their own interpretation of the FARs to force a carrier
to modify their operations through a whistleblower statute, that
statute would have an effect on the air carrier's "services."
The court agreed, finding that the ADA preempted the claim.
The court went further to rule that both the plain language of
187 Id. at 1072.
288 Id. at 1073-74.
289 Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1044 (D. Minn. 2001) (citing
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act , 49 U.S.C. § 42121).
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the ADA, as well as the underlying regulatory scheme of the
ADA, support a finding that Congress intended to expressly pre-
empt state whistleblower claims when the underlying violation is
based on the FARs. 9 ° Moreover, the court noted that Congress
recently enacted whistleblower protection through the Ford Act,
which further expressed the Congress' intent to preempt claims
like the plaintiffs in the state court. Based on these findings,
the court granted Omni's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's state
law claims on the basis of preemption.'
d. General Personal Injury Causes of Action Not Preempted
Snyder-Stulginkis v. United Air Lines, Inc. arose from an August
1999 crash of a Boeing 737-200 aircraft in Argentina operated by
Lineas Aereas Privadas Argentina ("LAPA").292 The decedents'
survivors alleged that defendant United Airlines had negligently
trained the LAPA pilots and that this negligent training was the
proximate cause of the fatal accident. The defendant then re-
moved the action to the Northern District of Illinois. The court
ruled on the plaintiff's motion to remand for lack of
jurisdiction.2 -3
In order to decide whether the removal was appropriate, the
court had to decide whether the ADA completely preempted
the plaintiffs' claims, thus creating federal question jurisdiction.
Because the plaintiffs had pleaded only state law causes of ac-
tion, this analysis arose in the context of an exception to the well
pleaded complaint rule: the doctrine of complete preemption.
After conducting an extensive review of the underlying case law,
the court decided that the ADA does not expressly preempt the
plaintiffs' claims and that the Savings Clause of the ADA has in
fact been found to preserve such claims. As such, the court
ruled that the plaintiffs claims were not preempted.29 4
e. Conflict between FAA and State Aeronautics Commission
In Big Stone Broadcasting, Inc. v. Lindbloom, the district court
was faced with the interesting question of whether the ADA pre-
empted certain state laws promulgated by the South Dakota Aer-
290 Id. at 1046-47.
291 Id. at 1047-49.
292 Snyder-Stulginkis v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 01 C 185, 2001 WL 1105128,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11665 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2001, as amended Sept. 20, 2001).
293 Snyder-Stulginkis, 2001 WL 1105128, at *1-2.
294 Id. at *2-7.
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onautics Commission ("SDAC") regarding the construction of
structures over a certain height.295 Plaintiff Big Stone Broadcast-
ing, Inc. had planned the construction of a tower near South
Shore, South Dakota, and had filed appropriate applications
with the Federal Communications Commission and the FAA. In
October of 1999, the FAA completed its aeronautical study con-
cerning the proposed tower under its guidelines found in 49
U.S.C. § 40103 and 14 C.F.R. Part 77. The FAA concluded that
the proposed construction would not be a hazard to air naviga-
tion and issued a "no hazard" determination.9 6
Based on the FAA's determination, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission granted Big Stone a construction permit in
February of 2000. At the same time, Big Stone had applied for
permission to construct the tower from SDAC. Even though the
SDAC was aware of the FAA's final determination, it denied per-
mission under the applicable state laws. Soon after the SDAC
denied its application, Big Stone filed suit against the SDAC pri-
marily arguing that the ADA preempted its decision. 9 7
The court reviewed the general rules applying to ADA pre-
emption, and the various regulations dealing with the FAA's
control of airspace in the United States. Finally, the court deter-
mined that Congress had granted the FAA sole sovereignty over
U.S. airspace and mandated that the FAA and other federal
agencies work together to determine proper placement of
broadcast hours. The court also determined that the FAA and
those agencies had in fact promulgated specific regulations in
response to Congress' mandate. Thus, the court felt that al-
lowing states to interfere with the federal agencies cooperation
would frustrate Congress' intent and erode the agency's effec-
tiveness. Therefore, the court ruled that the ADA preempted
the SDAC's decision, so the decision had no legal effect. 28
2. Constitutional Rights-Due Process and Equal Protection
In SeaAir NY, Inc. v. City of New York, the Second Circuit con-
sidered the City of New York's decision to ban a seaplane tour-
ing operation. 299 The plaintiff, SeaAir NY, Inc., wished to
provide site seeing tours out of its leased city-owned waterfront
295 Big Stone Broadcasting, Inc. v. Lindbloom, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D.S.D.
2001).
296 Id. at 1010-11.
297 Id. at 1012-13.
298 Id. at 1014-21.
29') SeaAir NY, Inc. v. City of New York, 250 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2001).
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property. The city issued a permit under its rules for the sea-
plane base, but disallowed operations including any commercial
air tours in order to minimize the noise impact on the general
public.""' In response to the restriction, the plaintiff sued the
city, alleging that the restriction violated the Supremacy, Due
Process, and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution as well
as the preemption provisions of the ADA." '"
The plaintiffs preemption argument under the Supremacy
Clause relied entirely on its assertion that it was engaged in "in-
terstate air transportation" as defined in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40102(a) (25). The plaintiff claimed that his operations fell
under the ADA's provisions shielding air carriers that provide
air transportation from state or local regulations affecting ser-
vice. Section 40102(a) (25) defines interstate air transportation,
in part, as transportation between a place in one state and
another. '1 2
The plaintiff argued that because its planes would fly from
New York airspace into New Jersey airspace and back during the
course of their site-seeing travels, they would travel between two
states in the meaning of this definition. The district and circuit
courts disagreed. "Despite SeaAir's urgings to the contrary, we
do not live in a world in which a piece of air can serve as a place
for the purposes of creating a 'between.' "303 Having decided
that "the 'places' to which the statute refers are on the ground,"
the circuit court affirmed the lower court's decision that the
plaintiff was not providing air transportation as defined under
the federal statute, thus its Supremacy Clause preemption argu-
ment failed. °4
The court then turned to the plaintiff's Due Process and
Equal Protection claims. In order for the plaintiff to prevail on
this claim, it must have shown that the city's regulation was an
exercise of power without any reasonable justification or govern-
mental objective.30 ' The circuit court felt, however, that the
state reasonably assumed that the reduction in flights would, in
fact, result in a reduction of noise. Accordingly, the court ruled
that the city's restrictions did not violate SeaAir's Due Process
rights. Making even shorter work of plaintiff's Equal Protection
300 Id. at 185.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 186.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 186-87.
305 Id. at 187.
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argument, the circuit court concluded that the lower court ap-
propriately dismissed the plaintiff's complaints and affirmed the
ruling.3"6
3. Constitutional Rights-Supremacy and Commerce Clauses
The United States Court for the Middle District of Florida
considered preemption arguments under the Constitution's
Supremacy and Commerce Clauses in National Bus. Av. Assoc. v.
City of Naples Airport Auth." 7 This case centered on attempts
made over several years by the Naples Aviation Authority (the
"Authority") to reduce aircraft noise levels at the Naples Munici-
pal Airport. As part of these efforts, the Authority banned
Stage 2 aircraft, i.e., those aircraft under 7,500 pounds maxi-
mum gross take-off weight, from operating at the Naples Munic-
ipal Airport as of August 30, 2001. The National Business
Aviation Association and the General Aviation Manufacturer's
Association, representing aircraft operators affected by the
Stage 2 ban, filed suit against the Authority, alleging that the
Stage 2 ban violated both the Supremacy Clause and Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.:""
Careful to proceed with caution to avoid unintended Federal
encroachment on state authority, the court followed the general
rule that when a statute operates in an area traditionally gov-
erned by state law, preemption will not lie unless it is "the clear
manifest purpose of Congress. ''3"' First, the court looked to
Dormant Commerce Clause issues, noting that negative or dor-
mant invocations of the Commerce Clause prohibit state regula-
tion that discriminates against or unduly burden interstate
commerce, while state laws that impose the same burden on
both in-state and out-of-state interests usually do not violate the
Commerce Clause:"'
Turning to the parties' cross motions for summary judgment,
the court determined that the ADA did not preempt that the
power exercised by the Authority. The court felt that the Au-
thority's ban on operations was neither unreasonable nor dis-
criminatory, because the study the Authority had performed to
justify the ban had conformed with the procedural require-
-- [d. at 188.
317 Nat'l Bus. Av. Assoc. v. City of Naples Airport Auth., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1343
(M.D. Fla. 2001).
-11 Id. at 1346.
3'09 Id. at 1348.
Iom Id. at 1349.
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ments of the applicable aviation noise statutes and regulations.
Moreover, because Congress had approved the process by which
the Authority had actually banned the aircraft, in conjunction
with its earlier reasonableness finding, the Court ruled that
there was no violation of the Commerce Clause. As such, the
Authority was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the
plaintiffs lawsuit. 1'
4. Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996
The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the liabil-
ity-limiting provisions of the Pilot Records Improvement Act of
1996312 preempted a defamation suit brought by a pilot against
his employer. In Sky Fun 1 v. Schuttloffel, John Schuttloffel had
been employed by Sky Fun 1 as a corporate pilot. 13 During one
flight with Sky Fun l's owner, Bill Kitchen, on board, lighting
struck the aircraft. Several days later, Kitchen informed Schut-
tioffel that his services were no longer required.31
Schuttloffel sought employment with Mountain Air Express
shortly thereafter. Under 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f), Mountain Air
sought the written records maintained by Sky Fun 1 pertaining
to Schuttloffel's proficiency, and he sent a consent and release
form allowing the prospective employer to obtain the records.
Kitchen filled out the standard checklist-type form used to con-
vey the records, writing on the report in large letters "CALL
ME!" next to entries concerning Schuttloffel proficiency and
safety. Kitchen, however, provided no documentation at that
time.
In response to Kitchen's "call me" notation, Mountain Air's
training coordinator spoke with Kitchen. Kitchen stated that
Schuttloffel was very good in flight simulators but not a good
pilot and that Mountain Air should not hire him. The training
coordinator requested written records supporting this state-
ment, but Kitchen replied that he did not keep such records.
Thereafter, Kitchen initiated several calls to the training coordi-
nator urging Mountain Air not to hire Schuttloffel. This
reached the point that the training coordinator would simply
put Kitchen on hold in order to avoid his calls. Eventually,
Kitchen faxed to the training coordinator a document labeled
3" Id. at 352-54.
312 Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 44936(g) (1996).
313 Sky Fun 1 v. Schuttloffel, 27 P.3d 361 (Colo. 2001).
114 Id. at 363-64.
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"Termination Report." It detailed three incidents where Schut-
tioffel allegedly acted dangerously in his capacity as a pilot.
Kitchen did not supplement this report with Schuttloffel's log
books or any of their supporting information. Moreover, during
trial Schuttloffel indicated that while he was employed by Sky
Fun 1, Kitchen had never supplied him with such a report.
Mountain Air eventually determined that Kitchen likely
fabricated the document to effect its decision in hiring
Schuttloffel. 15
In August of 1997, Sky Fun 1 filed suit against Schuttloffel
asserting negligence and seeking damages for costs of the repair
from the lightning strike incident. Schuttloffel denied negli-
gence and counterclaimed for withheld wages, vacation pay, tor-
tious interference with prospective contracts and defamation.
At a bench trial, the court found for Schuttloffel on the negli-
gence, wages, vacation pay and defamation claims. It ruled
against him on the remaining issues. The court of appeals af-
firmed. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado
considered whether the limited liability provisions of § 44936(g)
preempt a defamation suit under state law by a pilot applicant
against his former employer, when the defamatory verbal state-
ments are not based on records supplied by the previous em-
ployer pursuant to § 44936(f) (1). " '
The court began by looking to the statutory text. Section
44936 requires (among other things) that before hiring a pilot,
an air carrier shall request and receive records from any carriers
that have previously employed the individual pilot during the
five proceeding years. The statute also alleviates the air carrier's
concern for potential lawsuits by requiring the air carriers seek-
ing the written records to obtain a written consent and release
from liability from a pilot applicant. Moreover, the section lim-
its a record provider's liability from suits brought by the pilot
applicant: 17
After reviewing these provisions, the supreme court con-
cluded that the liability-limiting provision of the statute prevents
suits based on pilot records provided to a potential employer,
including oral statements made to explain the circumstances
and contents of such records. However, the court also felt that
Congress did not broadly immunize all oral statements. Rather,
'-5 [d. at 363-65.
'16 Id. at 365.
'117 Id. at 366.
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it chose to utilize the term "record" as the operative though un-
defined term in the limitation of liability provision. "We con-
clude that the preemptive term of the Act do not affect
Colorado common law defamation actions involving verbal as-
sertions that the speaker knew to be false or the speaker made
in reckless disregard of the truth, when the verbal statements
are not based upon previous employer's records."3 '
Finding that Kitchen's statements were false or made in reck-
less disregard of the truth (seemingly because, according to
Schuttloffel's testimony, Kitchen had called him at home after
he had been fired and stated that Schuttloffel had ruined
Kitchen's marriage and that Kitchen was going to destroy him),
the court agreed with the trial and appellate courts and ruled
that the Pilot Records Improvement Act did not preempt Schut-
tloffel's defamation claims.31 9
H. INSURANCE
A number of opinions addressed a range of insurance cover-
age and other issues in 2001.
1. Coverage Issues
a. Only "Non-Commercial" Operations Covered
In Avemco Ins. Co. v. Auburn Flying Services, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision in which it had granted
Avemco's motion for summary judgment, finding that a non-
commercial aviation policy that Avemco had issued to Auburn
Flying Services, Inc., did not cover an accident. 2° In October
1997, several organizations conducted a "fly-in" at the Auburn
Airport near Auburn, Nebraska. During the event, attendees
could pay $10.00 for a ten to fifteen minute airplane ride
around the local area in a plane piloted by Fred Farrington.
This money was collected at a table near the runway that had a
sign advertising the plane rides. While attempting to land dur-
ing one of these flights, the aircraft struck a passing semitractor
trailer and crashed. The three passengers died in the crash, and
Farrington died four months later. Avemco had issued a non-
commercial aviation insurance policy to Auburn Flying Services,
Inc. ("AFS"), covering the aircraft in question. Farrington, the
318 Id. at 368.
319 Id. at 370.
320 Avemco Ins. Co. v. Auburn Flying Serv., 242 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2001).
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The policy contained the following exclusion: "This policy
does not cover bodily injury, property damage, or loss.., when
your insured aircraft is ... used for a commercial purpose." The
policy defined "commercial purpose" as meaning "any use of
your insured aircraft for which an insured person receives, or
intends to receive, money or other benefits. It does not include:
(a) the equal sharing among occupants of the operating cost of
the flight. '13 22 The parties to the action had stipulated that the
money collected by Farrington was not sufficient to cover the
operating expenses of the flight. After the crash, representatives
of the decedents filed suit against AFS. Avemco, in turn, filed a
declaratory action seeking to determine if coverage existed
under the policy.3 2
3
In reviewing the lower court's opinion, the Eighth Circuit in-
terpreted the insurance policy under Nebraska law. Appellants
argued that the "commercial purpose" exclusion in the policy
was ambiguous, and cited several cases from other jurisdictions
that held "for a charge" and "for a fee" exclusions in similar
noncommercial airplane policies are ambiguous. Appellants
urged this point, because Nebraska courts construe ambiguous
insurance contracts in favor of the insured.324
The circuit court disagreed that the particular provision was
ambiguous, and the provision's interpretation was therefore a
matter of law for the court. That question boiled down to the
difference between a receipt of money for use of the aircraft and
an equal sharing of operating costs.3 21
In making this analysis, the court considered the general pur-
pose of the exclusionary clause. It deemed that the difference
in risks between these two types of flights (for charge versus
shared expenses) lies in the frequency of the flights:
[T] he purpose of the exclusionary clause is to reduce that risk by
limiting the total number of flights.... The receipt of money, or
some other benefit, for the use of an airplane provides additional
impetus or motivation for making the flight, and is thus likely to
increase the number of flights an insured will make .... On the
other hand, a shared expense flight suggests a common interest
321 id. at 821.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 822.
325 Id. at 823.
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in the flight other than the interest in making the particular
flight.
326
Further, the court held that in interpreting an insurance ex-
clusion clause, the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable per-
son, viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
arrangement, would conclude this arrangement was one of
"shared expenses" or a flight made for the receipt of money. 27
Applying this philosophy, the court decided that because
none of Farrington's passengers thought there was any agree-
ment to share expenses (or even that the set amount of $10.00
was actually for expenses), Farrington and his passengers pos-
sessed no community of interest other than taking the flight in
and of itself. Moreover, by providing these flights in conjunc-
tion with a fly-in, Farrington held himself out to provide flights
to the general public. As such, the $10 fee did not qualify as a
shared expense under the insurance policy-it was a commer-
cial operation. Therefore, the circuit court affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court and denied coverage.
28
b. No Coverage Due to Misrepresentations of Medical Status
The Eastern District of Virginia considered a petition for de-
claratory judgment on an insurance coverage issue in United
States Specialty Ins. Co. v. Skymaster of Virginia.2 9 The insurance
company asserted that there was no coverage, because the pilot
had fraudulently misrepresented and concealed medical infor-
mation pertinent to the issuance of the insurance policy.330 The
pilot had a history of diabetes, which he did not disclose to his
FAA medical examiner. Thus, at the time of the crash the pi-
326 Id. (citing Thompson v. Ezzell, 379 P.2d 983, 987 (Wash. 1963)).
327 Id. at 824.
-128 Id. at 825-26. Judge Lay issued a rather scathing dissent, indicating that he
felt that "whether the policy is analyzed in terms of ambiguity or in terms of
unreasonable results it imposes," he would come to the inescapable conclusion
that summary judgment was inappropriate in the case. Id. at 830. Although the
judge's impassioned dissent is understandable in light of the loss of coverage
going to the decedent's representatives, it seems misguided since it is focused
more on the numbers reflected by the discussion on shared expenses-whether
the shared expenses are less or more than the cost of operating the flight-than
the simple concept of receiving some amount of benefit rather than having a
common purpose for the flight in which expenses are shared almost after the
fact. Id. at 827-30.
329 United States Specialty Ins. Co. v. Skymaster, 123 F. Supp. 2d 995 (E.D. Va.
2000).
330 Id. at 996.
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lot's medical certificate was invalid due to the misrepresenta-
tions made to the medical examiner. In turn, the pilot failed
the policy's condition for coverage that he possess a current and
valid certificate.3"'
The court felt that Virginia law permitted this insurance ex-
clusion in light of the FARs addressing pilot certification. 2
Moreover, the court rejected the pilot's argument that a causal
connection must exist between the lack of proper medical certi-
fication and the crash in order to nullify the coverage. 3  In
summary, the court enforced the policy as written and granted
the insurance company's motion on denial of coverage because
the requirement that the pilot have a current and a proper med-
ical certificate was clear, unambiguous, and not unreasonable or
contrary to public policy.334
c. No Coverage for "In-Flight" Incident with "Low-Time"
Pilot
In Aviation Charters, Inc. v. Avemco Ins., a divided New Jersey
appellate court addressed whether New Jersey law requires an
insurer to prove a causal connection between circumstances that
trigger an exclusion in the insurance coverage and the loss it-
self 33 5 The policy in question excluded coverage for "in-flight"
operations (which included tax operations) conducted by an
unapproved pilot. An "approved" pilot was one who had logged
at least 5000 total flight hours. 36
The accident happened while a 2000-hour pilot taxied the air-
craft. The accident, however, was not related to an action of the
pilot, per se. The insurer moved for a denial of coverage based
on the exclusion in the policy for unapproved pilots. The
owner argued that the insurer must prove a causal connection
between the "low-time" pilot and the accident in order to en-
force the exclusion. The lower court agreed and entered judg-
ment against the insurer.3 7
The appellate court reviewed state cases that could be con-
strued to require a causal connection between an exclusionary
--, Id. at 997-99.
332 Id. at 1000-01.
'133 Id. at 1002-03.
534 Id. at 1003.
335 Aviation Charters, Inc. v. Avemco Ins., 763 A.2d 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000),
af[d as modified, 784 A.2d 712 (NJ. 2001).
336 763 A.2d at 313.
3 ld.
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clause and the accident in question. Although the appellate
court did not necessarily agree with the aircraft owner's reading
of the cases, it did acknowledge that the point is not crystal
clear.3 The court noted, however, that a majority of those
cases reject the proposition that a causal nexus between the loss
and a coverage-excluding event is required before the aviation
insurer can deny coverage. 33 9 At the end of the day, the court
determined that the State of New Jersey has consistently en-
forced exclusionary clauses that are clear and unambiguous
without imposition of a causal nexus where the exclusionary
clause does not officially so require. Thus, the court reversed
and remanded the lower court's decision. 40
The NewJersey Supreme Court "affirmed the judgment of the
Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in the
court's majority opinion." The court noted, however, that they
were not adopting "a per se rule holding that the absence of cau-
sality never be the basis for disregarding an unambiguous exclu-
sionary clause in an insurance policy."3 4' Recognizing that the
plaintiff, Aviation Charters, could have paid more to Avemco In-
surance to receive a policy that would cover a "lower-time" pilot
(which plaintiff was in fact doing on some of its other aircraft
insured by defendant), the court felt that requiring a causal con-
nection would "constitute an unbargained-for expansion of cov-
erage, gratis, resulting in the insurance company's exposure to a
risk substantially broader than that expressly insured against in
the policy. '"342
2. Federal Common Law and the "Released Value Doctrine"
In Kemper Ins. Co. v. Federal Express Corp., the First Circuit dealt
with the application of the "released value doctrine" to an avia-
tion insurance policy. 43' In this case, eight packages of jewelry
shipped via defendant-appellee Federal Express ("Fed Ex") ei-
ther never reached their destination or arrived empty. Each of
these packages was sent under the Fed Ex Master Power Ship
Agreement, which limits Fed Ex's liability in a manner described
in its service guide. The service guide, explained that liability
338 Id. at 314-16.
339 Id. at 316-17 (citations omitted).
340 Id. at 318.
34, Aviation Charters, Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 712, 713 (N.J. 2001).
3442 Id. at 714 (internal citations omitted).
343 Kemper Ins. Co. v. Federal Express Corp., 252 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001).
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with regard to any packages was limited to $100.00, unless a
higher value was specifically declared on the applicable air way-
bill. For most items, Fed Ex would allow the shipper to declare
a value up to $50,000, but for items of "extraordinary value,"
including jewelry, the maximum declared value was limited to
$500.00. At the time of the shipment, the shipper-Homes Pro-
tection Group, Inc.-had purchased third party insurance from
plaintiff-appellant Kemper Insurance Companies ("Kemper").
Kemper, as the subrogee, sought to invalidate the $100.00 limi-
tation of liability. The district court concluded that the limita-
tion of liability was valid, and the circuit court affirmed. 44
As an initial matter, Kemper had brought claims against Fed
Ex in tort and in contract. Fed Ex then moved to dismiss the
tort claims as preempted by the ADA. Although the lower court
held that the savings clause of the ADA preserved federal com-
mon law remedies in tort for lost shipments, it also concluded
that the air waybill limited Fed Ex's liability to $100.00 per ship-
ment and that Kemper could not avoid this limitation by recast-
ing its claims as a tort action. The court therefore granted the
motion to dismiss with respect to the tort claim.345
With respect to Kemper's contract claims, the district court
determined that under the applicable federal common law, spe-
cifically the "released of value doctrine," Fed Ex's limitation on
liability was valid, because it allowed the shipper to increase Fed
Ex's exposure to $50,000, with a correspondingly higher ship-
ping fee. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Kemper's
claim to void the limitation on contract liability based on public
policy and granted Fed Ex partial summary judgment on the
breach of contract claim based on the $100.00 limitation of
liability. 346
Initially, the circuit court turned to federal common law and
the released value doctrine. Although traditional common law
forbids a carrier from disclaiming liability for its own negli-
gence, "the released value doctrine allows an air carrier to 'limit
its liability for injury, loss or destruction of baggage on a 're-
leased valuation.' ,347
The basis for this doctrine is that in exchange for a lower ship-
ping rate, the shipper is deemed to have released the carrier
344 Id. at 510-11.
345 Id. at 511.
346 Id. at 511.
347 Id. at 512 (citations omitted).
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from liability beyond a stated amount. The shipper, however, is
bound by this agreement only if (1) it has reasonable notice of
the higher rate for improved coverage and (2) it is given a fair
opportunity to pay a higher rate in order to obtain greater pro-
tection.348 While Kemper conceded that the shipper had rea-
sonable notice of the limitation of liability, it contended that
Fed Ex's rate structure did not give the shipper "a fair opportu-
nity to pay a higher rate in order to obtain greater protec-
tion. ' 49 In essence, Kemper argued that because the shipper
did not have the opportunity to ensure its property to its full
value, the shipper did not have the opportunity to obtain
greater protection.
The circuit court was unsympathetic to this argument, espe-
cially in light of the fact that the very existence of such a limita-
tion allows Kemper to market their third-party insurance to
shippers. This consideration was even stronger in light of the
fact that it was Kemper, the third party subrogee, who was bring-
ing suit. As such, the circuit court affirmed the lower court's
ruling with respect to the released value doctrine:""
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS
1. Review of FAA Final Orders
In Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority v. FAA, the Tenth
Circuit reviewed the FAA's decision to suspend the Arapahoe
County Public Airport Authority's (the "Authority") eligibility
for discretionary federal grants, based on violations of federal
statutes and existing grant provisions.151 The Authority urged
the circuit court to set aside the FAA's decision for various rea-
sons. One notable reason was that the decision was incompati-
ble with an opinion recently issued by the Colorado Supreme
Court.3 52
348 Id. at 512.
34SI Id. at 512-13.
350 Id. at 513-14. The circuit court also addressed Kemper's claims under the
Carmack Amendment and its claims of willful and wanton misconduct. Analyz-
ing both issues at length, the court agreed with the lower court that Kemper's
proposed amendments to its complaint seeking to add such causes would have
indeed been futile and as such affirmed the lower court on this point as well. Id.
at 514-16.
351 Arapahoe County Pub. Airport Auth. v. FAA, 242 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir.
2001).
352 Id. at 1216.
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The Authority owns and operates Centennial Airport, located
south of Denver, Colorado. Over the course of several years, the
Authority had accepted millions of dollars in discretionary
grants from the FAA. In return for the grants, the Authority
made assurances that: 1) the airport would be available for pub-
lic use on reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination to
any person, firm or corporation, and 2) to conduct or engage in
any aeronautical activity to furnish services to the public. The
grant assurances did recognize, however, that the Authority
could prohibit operations or classes of aeronautical use if those
actions were necessary for the safe operation of the airport.
Centennial Express Airlines (the "Airline") was interested in
providing scheduled passenger service at the airport and filed
an official application to that end in May 1993. The Authority
refused to consider such service and sought guidance from the
FAA. The Authority ultimately decided to ban the Airline's re-
quest without waiting to hear from the FAA. In contravention of
the ban, the Airline initiated scheduled service between Centen-
nial Airport and Dalhart, Texas in December 1994. The Author-
ity immediately sought and obtained a temporary injunction in
state district court to prevent the Airline from operating the
scheduled service. The Colorado Supreme Court eventually is-
sued an opinion reinstating the permanent injunction (which
had been granted by the trial court but reversed on intermedi-
ate appeal), despite concurrent complaints on file with the FAA.
Also, the court held that federal law did not preempt the Au-
thority's ban on scheduled service or violate the terms of the
nondiscrimination grant assurances. :
While litigation progressed in state court, three complaints
had been filed with the FAA. Shortly after the Colorado Su-
preme Court issued its decision, the FAA issued its final determi-
nation that the Authority's ban of scheduled operations violated
the grant assurances and federal law. In light of the FAA's final
decision, the Authority filed its petition for review with the cir-
cuit court. 54
The Authority asked the Tenth Circuit to set aside the final
FAA order for three errors of law. The Authority first argued
that the Colorado Supreme Court's decision was final, preclu-
sive and dispositive of the issues resolved in the FAA's final or-
3-3 /d. at 1216-17.
54 id. at 1217.
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der pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Act.155 The FAA
responded that the Full Faith and Credit Act was not technically
implicated, because it was an agency rather than a court. How-
ever, the FAA recognized that it would be governed by common
law preclusion similar to the concepts embodied in the Act.
The circuit court agreed that the preclusive effect of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court decision, if any, would derive from the
common law doctrines of resjudicata and issue preclusion rather
than the Act. Moreover the court observed that the Supremacy
Clause trumps the full faith and credit determinations if the
state court judgment or decree restrained the exercise of the
United States' sovereign power. Therefore, the court deter-
mined that it would have to balance the common law justifica-
tion for full faith and credit with the competing policy
supporting the Supremacy Clause. 5"
The court began this analysis on the full faith and credit side
of the equation. In reviewing the Colorado Supreme Court's
decision, as well as the final decision and order from the FAA,
the circuit court determined that full faith and credit to be af-
forded to the supreme court's decision was mitigated by several
factors. First, the supreme court's preemption analysis was not
as fully developed and as well defined as that conducted by the
FAA. Second, the supreme court decision was a badly fractured
plurality opinion. Finally, the FAA was not a party to, nor in
privity with a party to, the state court proceedings. Without the
FAA as a party, the Court's decision could not satisfy a funda-
mental requirement of issue preclusion under federal or Colo-
rado law.
Turning to the Supremacy Clause, the court first observed
that the issue before the FAA was whether the Authority com-
plied with conditions imposed on it by federal law in an agree-
ment with a federal administrative agency in return for the
Authority's receipt of federal funds. With this issue in mind, the
circuit court conducted a preemption analysis, noting that it is
"difficult to visualize a more comprehensive scheme of com-
bined regulation, subsidization, and operational participation
than that which Congress has provided in the field of avia-
tion. Moreover, if rulings similar to the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinions were deemed preclusive, it would frustrate the
355 Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2002).
356 Arapaho, 242 F.3d at 1218-19.
357 Id. at 1220-21 (citations omitted).
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FAA's ability to discharge its statutory duty to interpret and im-
plement federal aviation statutes governing the enforcement of
grant assurances. Therefore, the court ruled that the strong fed-
eral supremacy policy in the field of aviation prevailed over full
faith and credit principles, and the Colorado Supreme Court's
decision would have no bearing on the FAA's decision being re-
viewed by the court.3 58
The circuit court then turned to the Authority's second argu-
ment-that the Authority, rather than the FAA, should be re-
sponsible for local and regional aviation planning and safety.
Once again, the circuit court conducted a preemption review
relying on the ADA, holding that a local political subdivision of
a state may not enact or enforce a law, regulation or other provi-
sion having the force and effect of law related to a price, route
or service of an air carrier.3 5 ' The circuit court quickly deter-
mined that the Authority's ban of scheduled service was con-
nected with and related to both services and routes. The court
also discussed in detail whether or not the ban was otherwise
permissible because it constituted an exercise of the Authority's
proprietary power. Agreeing with the FAA on this point, the
court determined that the ban was not an appropriate exercise
of the Airport owner's proprietary powers, so the Authority's
ban was preempted under the ADA and the Supremacy
Clause.36°
Finally, with respect to the Authority's third argument, the cir-
cuit court agreed with the FAA that the present facts did not
warrant prospective consideration of how 1996 legislative
amendments requiring airports to have a 14 C.F.R. Part 139 cer-
tificate for scheduled passenger service might apply to the case
at hand. As such, the circuit court denied the Authority's peti-
tion in full and affirmed the final FAA's order. 6'
The Tenth Circuit issued an opinion in another petition for
review of a final decision in Custer County Action Ass'n v. Gar-
vey. 62 Here the petitioners asked the circuit court to reverse the
FAA's and Air National Guard's (the "ANG") orders approving
the Colorado Airspace Initiative ("the Initiative") and finding
the final environmental impact statement on the initiative to be
358 Id. at 1221.
359 Id. at 1221 (citing to 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)).
'160 Id. at 1222-24.
'61 Id. at 1224.
313 Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
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adequate. Petitioners also claimed that implementation of the
Initiative would violate their property rights under the Third
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution."'
The controversy was triggered by the Initiative-proposed
special use airspace changes to the National Airspace System de-
signed to (1) provide the necessary airspace for the Colorado
ANG 140th Tactical Fighter Wing to be able to train under real-
istic conditions, and (2) to respond to changes in commercial
aircraft arrival and departure corridors required for operation
of the Denver International Airport. The Initiative involved
rather extensive changes to several military operating areas, mil-
itary training routes and restricted areas. 61
As part of this process the ANG issued a final environmental
impact statement in October 1997. In October 1999, the FAA
issued a final order adopting the final environmental impact
statement and directing that the required special use airspace
changes to the National Airspace System be implemented. The
petitioners then filed their petition for review of the ANG and
FAA orders in November 1999.365
The petitioners raised three challenges to the ANG's and
FAA's approval of the Initiative. First, they argued that the FAA
had violated Section 40103 of the Federal Aviation Act, the ap-
plicable federal aviation regulations, and the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act. Second, they claimed that the ANG and the FAA
had violated the National Environmental Policy Act and its im-
plementing regulations. Finally, they argued that the ANG and
FAA violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution by taking petitioners' property interests without due pro-
cess of law, and violated the Third Amendment by
appropriating petitioners' property interests and invading peti-
tioners' privacy for military purposes during peacetime without
their consent. The circuit court addressed each of these argu-
ments in turn.3 66
The circuit court first noted that the FAA had violated its own
statute and regulations and that it was precluded from second
guessing the administration under the political question doc-
trine, although the circuit court was free to review whether the
FAA had acted within the scope of its powers or had followed its
363 Id. at 1027-28.
364 Id. at 1028-29.
365 Id. at 1029.
366 Id. at 1030.
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own regulations or the Constitution. 67 Within this framework,
the court reviewed whether the FAA had made the proper find-
ing of necessity under the applicable statute, had properly lim-
ited military airspace under the applicable regulation, and had
followed the appropriate regulations with respect to minimum
flight altitudes. Addressing each point in turn, the circuit court
determined that the FAA had not violated the Federal Aviation
Act, the applicable regulations, or the Administrative Proce-
dures Act by approving the Initiative. 6
The court also extensively reviewed petitioners' claims with re-
spect to the National Environmental Policy Act. In the end, the
court determined that the ANG and the FAA had not acted in
contravention of that act."')
Finally, the court turned to the petitioners' constitutional
claims. In response to the assertion that the Initiative violated
the Fifth Amendment the court observed that injunctive relief is
not available under the Fifth Amendment absent an allegation
that the purported taking is unauthorized by law. Because the
court had already determined that the Initiative was in fact au-
thorized, it denied petitioners' request for injunctive relief on
Fifth Amendment grounds."7
Petitioners also insisted that they had a Third Amendment
right to "refuse military aircraft training in airspace within the
immediate reaches of their property," and that the military
flights to be conducted under the initiative would be per se un-
constitutional."7 The crux of petitioners' argument seemed to
be that because a private party has a right to the airspace above
his or her property, the United States military may not appropri-
ate such property interests during peacetime without a property
owner's consent. The circuit court responded that this argu-
ment "borders on the frivolous." In short, the circuit court over-
ruled this claim noting that "it is not reasonable to expect
privacy from the lawful operation of military aircraft in public
navigable airspace. :3 72
In Friends of Richards-Gebaur Airport v. FAA, the Eighth Circuit
reviewed the FAA's order closing the Richards-Gebaur Airport
M7 Id. at 1031.
. Id. at 1032-34.
I d. at 1034-41.
370 Id. at 1042.
371 Id. at 1042-43.
372 Id. at 1043-44.
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in Kansas City, Missouri.3 73 This order was rather controversial
in the general aviation community and triggered several peti-
tions for review, one from a group of local pilots calling them-
selves the Friends of Richards-Gebaur Airport ("Friends"), and
the second from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
("AOPA"). The Eighth Circuit consolidated the petitions for
purposes of briefing and argument.
374
The Richards-Gebaur Airport was built in 1941 on land owned
by the City of Kansas City, Missouri. From the 1950s through
the mid-1970s, the airport was used as an air force base. In
1985, the United States conveyed the property back to Kansas
City pursuant to the Surplus Property Act. The conveyance re-
quired the city to use the property as a public use airport, which
it did between 1984 and 1994. Over that time, the city accepted
approximately $12.2 million in federal airport improvement
program funds for airport development.
For several years, the airport had consistently lost money. Be-
tween 1984 and 1997, losses exceeded $18 million and were sub-
sidized by the city's other two commercial airports. In light of
these losses, in 1998 the FAA and Kansas City negotiated a mem-
orandum agreement in which the FAA concluded that the city
could be released from its grant assurances under the Surplus
Property Act and the Airport Improvement Program. In early
1999, the Kansas City council approved an ordinance enabling
the Kansas City Railroad Company to developed property. In
late 1999, the FAA released the city from its federal obligations
to maintain the property as an airport, allowing the city to close
the airport and maintain it for non-aeronautical uses consistent
with the memorandum of agreement entered into between the
FAA and Kansas City. The FAA prepared no formal environ-
mental analysis of this proposed action, but it did consider sev-
eral pertinent environmental factors before concluding that the
closure was categorically excluded from requirement of prepar-
ing an environmental assessment.3 75
After the FAA issued its letter releasing Kansas City from its
federal obligations with respect to the airport, Friends filed a
petition for judicial review of the FAA's actions. Friends chal-
lenged the FAA's decision to categorically exclude the closure of
the airport from the requirement of preparing an environmen-
373 Friends of Richards-Gebaur Airport v. FAA, 251 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 2001).
374 Id. at 1182-83.
375 Id. at 1183-84.
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tal assessment. AOPA petitioned the court as well, asserting that
the FAA had failed to satisfy the standards of the Surplus Prop-
erty Act and that it lacked authority to release Kansas City from
its federal obligations.Y
The crux of petitioners' argument challenging the FAA's deci-
sion was that the FAA failed to adequately consider all of the
relevant extraordinary circumstances that would prevent the use
of the categorical exclusions.3 77 The FAA had reviewed a num-
ber of environmental impacts under the proposed action and
had concluded that no extraordinary circumstances existed to
preclude a categorical exclusion. Nonetheless, the Friends con-
tended that the FAA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
failing to consider seven different extraordinary circumstances:
(1) the release of the airport property was environmentally con-
troversial; (2) the FAA had ignored or improperly discounted
evidence indicating that a substantial community disruption was
likely and that the action would cause a significant increase in
surface traffic congestion; (3) closing the airport would result in
increased and impermissible noise pollution; (4) under the
FAA's own regulations, an extraordinary circumstance exists
where a government action has a significant impact on air qual-
ity; (5) the new railroad facility would adversely effect historical
property; (6) under the FAA's airport environmental handbook,
an extraordinary circumstance exists if the action is "likely to be
highly controversial with respect to the availability of adequate
relocation housing;" and (7) although the FAA could properly
categorically exclude the release of airport property, it could
not categorically exclude the construction of a railroad track. 78
In each case, the circuit court reviewed the petitioners' conten-
tions and determined that none demonstrated an extraordinary
circumstance. Thus, the court held that the FAA had not acted
in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
The court then turned to the petitioners' second major argu-
ment, that the FAA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously when
it released Kansas City from its federal obligations with respect
to aeronautical use at the airport. The contention focused on
the specific language within the statute allowing the Secretary of
Transportation to waive a property owner's grant assurances and
373 Id. at 1184.
377 Id. at 1185-86 (discussing National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-70).
178 Id. at 1186-93.
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obligations. Specifically, the statute requires the secretary to de-
termine that a waiver will not frustrate the purpose for which
the gift was made and is "necessary to advance the civil aviation
interests of the United States." '379 The gist of the petitioners'
argument was that the FAA had acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously because the release issued by the FAA did not specifically
find that the release of Richards-Gebaur's airport property was
"necessary to advance the civil aviation interests of the United
States," as worded in the statute. The circuit court decided that
although the FAA's release did not specifically use this language,
the substance of the release taken as a whole did embody the
concept. As such, the court concluded that the FAA's decision
was not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.""
In Yetman v. Garvey, the Seventh Circuit faced yet another
challenge to the FAA's age 60 rule.3 " The opinion represented
the latest in a long string of petitions challenging the FAA's re-
fusal to allow pilots over the age of 60 to serve as pilots on board
commercial air carriers. The petitioners made three main argu-
ments in a petition for review: (1) the FAA had made inconsis-
tent policy determinations with respect to the age 60 rule, (2)
the petitioners had each passed an appropriate age 60 exemp-
tion protocol, and (3) accident studies had demonstrated that
pilots over the age of 60 were just as safe, if not safer, than
younger pilots. 8 2
Under their inconsistent determination argument, the peti-
tioners made three specific assertions. First, the petitioners ar-
gued that while the FAA does not permit U.S. air carriers to
employ pilots over the age of 60, the U.S. does allow foreign air
carriers flying within the United States to use pilots over the age
of 60. The FAA responded, and the court agreed, that the FAA
is required to do so under the Convention on International Civil
Aviation. The petitioners' second assertion was that other per-
sons under the age of 60 could obtain medical exemptions and
the FAA surely could monitor the health of healthy pilots who
had reached the age of 60. In response the FAA asserted, and
the circuit court agreed, that the FAA was better able to monitor
discreet physical problems in the younger pilots and it could not
do so with pilots over the age of 60. As such, the FAA had not
379 Id. at 1194 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 47153(a)(1)).
380 For a recently reported decision from the First Circuit that addresses simi-
lar issues, see Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 259 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2001).
381 Yetman v. Garvey, 261 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2001).
382 Id. at 669-70.
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acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The final assertion was that
there had been a change in world standards with respect to the
age limitations on pilots. However, the court noted that, "such
evidence is of little significance in our view for the petition for
exemptions." In short, just because other countries allow their
pilots to fly longer does not mean that the FAA has acted arbi-
trarily if it chooses not to do so.383
Under the petitioners' second argument that they had com-
plied with an appropriate age 60 protocol, the FAA argued that
the protocol used has not been sufficiently developed to allow
for adequate monitoring of the cognitive abilities of pilots over
the age of 60. As such the court held that the FAA did not act
arbitrarily in deciding not to use the protocol proposed by the
pilots.3 84
Finally, the petitioners' argued that certain accident risk stud-
ies had demonstrated the safety of pilots over the age of 60. The
circuit court held that the FAA's rejection of the studies was
proper, because they did not contain evidence that experience
gained after the age of 60 neutralized the dangers of sudden
incapacitation and deterioration of piloting skills., 5 Accord-
ingly, the circuit court determined that the FAA appropriately
denied the exemptions, and the court therefore affirmed the
FAA's order.
One final case addressing the review of FAA orders was the
First Circuit's recent opinion in Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA. 8"
A group of preservation organizations, towns, and stewards of
several historic sites filed a petition for review of the FAA's deci-
sion to allow Shuttle America Airlines to commence scheduled
passenger service between LaGuardia Airport outside of New
York City and Hanscom Field, a general aviation airport 15 miles
outside of Boston. The court determined that while the plain-
tiffs did have standing to challenge the FAA's order, they could
not overcome the FAA's assessment that the increase in flights
would have a de minimus environmental impact.
2. Review of DOT Orders
In City of New York v. Mineta, the City of New York petitioned
the Second Circuit for review of four orders of the Secretary of
383 Id. at 669-73.
'1 Id. at 673-76.
385 Id. at 676-79.
'186 Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2001).
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Transportation granting takeoff and landing slots to airlines that
service New York's LaGuardia and Kennedy Airports. 7 The
DOT's implementation of the Wyndell H. Ford Aviation Invest-
ment and Reform Act for the 21st Century ("AIR21") triggered
this action."' Congress enacted AIR21 because of its growing
impatience with the amount of time it took the Secretary of
Transportation to grant exemptions from slot requirements
under authority that Congress had given to the Secretary in
1994.389 AIR21 accelerated the phase-out of the high density
rule (the "HDR") at the four airports where it still remained
(LaGuardia, Kennedy, Chicago O'Hare and Washington, D.C.'s
Reagan National), with the HDR to be phased out at LaGuardia
and Kennedy as of January 1, 2007. Moreover AIR21 provided
interim slot rules so that new entrants could offer services to the
airports until that date .3 9 " These interim rules were rather com-
plex and provided for very fast time lines granting slot
exemptions.
In anticipation of AIR21 becoming law, DOT had been mov-
ing forward with granting four slot exemptions. The Depart-
ment granted those exemptions shortly before AIR21 became
law in April of 2000.31' These slot exemptions were the focus of
the city's petition for review.
The city claimed that DOT had failed to perform a required
environmental review, that it did not consider certain statutory
factors, and that it did not evaluate each airline's application
individually prior to issuing the orders. 92 In response, DOT as-
serted that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review
the matter. Alternatively, the Secretary argued that because
AIR21 left him with no discretion in granting slot exemptions at
the New York airports and imposed such short and mandatory
deadlines, the governing statutes did not require an environ-
mental analysis. 93
In order to answer the petitioners' claims, the circuit court
extensively reviewed and analyzed AIR21. The court found that
387 City of New York v. Mineta, 262 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2001).
388 Wyndell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century
("AIR21"), Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C.).
389 Id. at 172-73.
390 Id. at 173.
391 Id. at 175.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 176.
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(1) the imposition on the Department of nondiscretionary man-
dates and short deadlines for granting the slot exemptions re-
lieved the agency of the requirements to conduct an
environmental review; (2) AIR21 provided no exceptions to the
mandate that the slot exemptions be granted, and gave DOT no
exercise of discretion over the grants; (3) although a provision
in the act granted DOT discretion to assess economic benefits in
the context of considering an exemption for a carrier using for-
eign aircraft for which there were competing U.S.-made aircraft,
the city had waived or forfeited its argument that such discretion
required the preparation of environmental review; (4) a provi-
sion in AIR21 expressly excluding the grant of slot exemptions
at the Washington Reagan National Airport from environmental
review requirements supported the court's conclusion that DOT
lacked discretion when granting exemptions at LaGuardia and
Kennedy; (5) a provision in the act allowing DOT to suspend
the short deadline to allow carrier applicants to supplement in-
complete applications did not empower the agency to toll the
deadline in order to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment; and finally (6) DOT's issuance of blanket orders granting
exemptions did not violate AIR21 because DOT's role in the
grants was mandatory and the use of blanket orders was within
its discretion. Accordingly, the city's petition for review was
denied. '4
3. Review of Rulemaking
In Air Transport Ass'n of Canada v. FAA, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed an in-
terim final rule of the Federal Aviation Administration regard-
ing the payment of overflight fees by foreign air carriers. 95 The
FAA had initially promulgated a fee structure in response to the
Federal Aviation Authorization Act of 1996 (the "Act").396
These fees cover air traffic control and related services provided
to the foreign carrier overflights, and the Act requires that they
be directly related to the FAA's cost of providing such
services.397
In 1997, the FAA issued an interim final rule establishing the
first fee schedule for overflights. Airlines affected by the 1997
-4 /d. at 176-184.
395 Air Transport Ass'n of Canada v. FAA, 254 F.3d 271 (D.D.C. 2001).
396 Federal Aviation Authorization Act of 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 45301 (the "Act").
197 Id. § 274-75.
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fee schedule challenged that rule, contending that the FAA ex-
ceeded its statutory authority by computing fees, at least in part,
on the value of the services to the recipient rather than on the
cost. The circuit court agreed with the petitioners, vacated the
1997 rule, and remanded it to the FAA for further proceed-
ings.9 In June 2000, the FAA published its second interim final
rule establishing a new schedule of overflight fees. This opinion
dealt with a challenge to the second rule. 99
The petitioners' first argument was that in promulgating the
rule the FAA was required (but failed) to comply with the appro-
priate notice and comment procedures of the Administrative
Procedures Act. The circuit court ruled that because it had va-
cated the previous rule, the new interim rule could be treated as
if it was a first interim rule and could be made without notice
and comment. °°
Second, the petitioners challenged the new interim rule, as-
serting that the FAA's adoption of that rule was arbitrary, capri-
cious and an abuse of discretion. The petitioners contended
that the FAA erroneously concluded that costs for providing ser-
vices to non-overflights are the same as costs for providing ser-
vices to overflights. In response, the court held that the FAA
had failed to articulate the basis for its conclusion that the unit
cost of providing air traffic control services to overflights within
each environment was identical to the unit cost of providing
such services to all traffic within each environment. Accord-
ingly, the circuit court vacated the 2000 rule and remanded
once again to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion.""
Note, however, that the Security Act moots this string of dis-
putes between the air carriers and the FAA on overflight fees.
The Act provides that the FAA shall impose such fees using a
"reasonably related" rather than "directly related" standard for
determining such costs, and the this imposition would not be
subject to judicial review, i.e. while the FAA lost the battles on
this point, with the help of Congress it won the war.40 2
3 Id. § 275.
9 Id. § 276.
400 Id. § 277-78.
401 Id. § 279.
402 Security Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 45301 (b) (1) (B).
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J. GENERAL LEGAL ISSUES
1. Personal Jurisdiction
In Patrick v. Massachusetts Port Authority, Defendants Massachu-
setts Port Authority ("Massport") and AMR Corporation moved
to dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. 4" The plaintiff, Dorothy Patrick, fell while walking
through a restricted area at Logan Airport with a tour group
when the group was transferring between aircraft. Patrick filed
negligence claims against, among others, Massport and AMR
Corp. 40
4
The court noted that because Patrick asserted general rather
than specific jurisdiction, the degree of contact with the forum
necessary to support her jurisdiction claim was high. Specifi-
cally, Patrick had to show that the defendant had continuous
and systematic contacts with or linkage to the forum state.40 5
Massport showed that it maintained no place of business or facil-
ities in the forum state and that it owned no property there.
Furthermore, Massport was not registered to do business in New
Hampshire, did not transact business there and had no employ-
ees working there. Although the plaintiff asserted that Massport
promoted its airport in New Hampshire, encouraged the use of
a local airport there, and served a significant number of forum
state residents, the court ruled such contacts were insufficient to
permit the exercise of general personal jurisdiction. Accord-
ingly, the court granted the Airport Authority's motion to
dismiss. o
AMR contended that the court lacked personal jurisdiction
because AMR is a holding company, without employees, located
in Texas, and it does not transact business in New Hampshire.
In essence, AMR demonstrated that it owned the company that
owned the airline in question. In response, the plaintiff argued
that AMR was subject to personal jurisdiction based on its status
as a successor to Business Express, a named defendant that was
merged into a subsidiary of AMR in December 2001. However,
because the court found that the plaintiff could offer no evi-
dence showing that AMR was Business Express' successor under
"(," Patrick v. Mass. Port Auth., 141 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D.N.H. 2001).
404 [d. at 182.
,405 Id. at 184.
4i6 Id. at 184-85.
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any of the applicable state statutes, the court granted AMR's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction." 7
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
a. No SMJ under Discretionary Function Exception to the
FTCA
The issue in GATX/Airlog Co. v. United States was whether the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the discre-
tionary function exception to the FTCA in the plaintiffs lawsuit
against the FAA."' This controversy began when the GATX/
Airlog Company ("Airlog"), a company in the business of con-
verting passenger aircraft into cargo freighters, hired Hayes In-
ternational Corporation ("Hayes"), an aeronautical engineering
company, to design cargo conversions for the Boeing 747 pas-
senger airplanes and to obtain appropriate supplemental type
certificates ("STCs") from the FAA. Part of the process in ob-
taining the STCs was the selection of an engineering methodol-
ogy that could generate the necessary compliance data.
Airlog claimed that in 1986 the FAA determined that one par-
ticular method was acceptable to assure regulatory compliance.
The FAA reaffirmed this conclusion in 1987 and 1988. In 1988,
based on that conclusion, the FAA issued Hayes and Airlog two
STCs, thereby approving its conversion design. Hayes, with the
FAA's authorization, assigned the STCs to Airlog. Airlog con-
verted ten Boeing 747 aircraft to cargo freighters under these
STCs between 1988 and 1994. After the conversions, the aircraft
experienced significant structural problems. As a result, in 1996
the FAA issued an airworthiness directive which reduced the al-
lowable payload by approximately 100,000 pounds. As part of
the airworthiness directive, the FAA concluded that the original
design methodology used was insufficient. Moreover, in order
to reinstate the full load capacity of the aircraft, the FAA ruled
that additional data would have to be generated under a differ-
ent engineering methodology. The effect of this chain of events
was that the cargo capacity of the converted aircraft were signifi-
cantly reduced.: 9
As a result of the reduction in payload, the owners of the con-
verted airplanes sued Airlog. Airlog then sued the United States
under the FTCA, claiming that the FAA had been negligent in
407 Id. at 185.
408 GATX/Airlog Co. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2000).
409 Id. at 1092-93.
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approving the original design methodology and negligently is-
sued STCs based on that method. The government moved to
dismiss Airlog's complaint, arguing that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the FAA's alleged conduct
was protected by the discretionary function exception to the
FTFCA. The district court granted the government's motion, and
Airlog appealed. 1
The Ninth Circuit first noted that while the FTCA grants fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over damages claims against the United
States for the negligent acts of Federal employee, the act has not
waived its immunity for claims based upon the exercise or per-
formance of a discretionary function or duty on the part of the
federal agency or employee.4"1 In order to determine whether a
particular action falls under this discretionary function excep-
tion, the courts follow a two part test laid out by the Supreme
Court in Berkowitz v. United States. 412
Applying the facts to the law, the circuit court ruled that the
government had met its burden on the first prong of the
Berkowitz test because, although the FAA must examine "perti-
nent technical data" before issuing an STC, the FAA has discre-
tion to determine what constitutes such pertinent technical data
and whether to issue an STC. 4 3 Likewise, the Circuit Court also
ruled that the government had met its burden under the second
prong of the Berkowitz test, because the FAA's conduct in the
present case was susceptible to policy analysis.41 4 With both
prongs Berkowitz met, the circuit court affirmed the district
court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA.41 5
b. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Zephyr Aviation L.L.C. v. Dailey, plaintiff-appellant Zephyr
Aviation LLC ("Zephyr") appealed the dismissal of its constitu-
tional tort action against Robert Allen Daily and Kenneth Wayne
Clary (the defendants).41 " Zephyr contended that the FAA's ad-
ministrative remedies do not contemplate constitutional tort ac-
tions against FAA inspectors in an individual capacity; therefore,
41 I ld. at 1093.
41 Id. at 1093-94.
412 Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
4 13 Id. at 1095-96.
414 Id. at 1096-98.
415 Id. at 1098.
411 Zephyr Aviation L.L.C. v. Dailey, 247 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2001).
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the district court erred in dismissing its claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction after concluding that Zephyr had failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies.417
The case arose when the FAA received a hotline complaint
alleging that one of Zephyr's aircraft was being used for illegal
charter flights. Specifically, the complaint alleged that some
flight hours accumulated by the aircraft were not being properly
recorded in its logs. Defendants were aviation safety inspectors
who investigated the matter. At one point during the investiga-
tion, the defendants placed a condition notice on the aircraft, as
well as a "notice of proposed certificate action" stating that the
aircraft's airworthiness certificate had been "revoked." The FAA
later issued an amended aircraft condition notice noting that
the airworthiness certificate was "invalid" because of unrecorded
flight time. Zephyr's attorneys spoke with the FAA, who told the
attorney that the airworthiness certificate had never been re-
voked, but that the aircraft was not airworthy because of unre-
corded flight hours. After reviewing steps taken to correct the
maintenance reports, the FAA retracted the condition notice in
a letter to Zephyr.41 8
Less than a year later, Zephyr sold the aircraft at a considera-
ble loss. Shortly thereafter, Zephyr sued the defendants claim-
ing that when they purported to "revoke" the aircraft's
airworthiness certificate, the defendants were acting ultra vires
and with malice. Zephyr argued that it was damaged in the
amount of the lost value of the aircraft due to the action of "rev-
ocation" of the airworthiness certificate, without due process of
law and in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States and the Texas Constitution.4 The defendants then re-
moved the action to federal court and moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because Zephyr failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The
district court granted their motion.42
Zephyr's suit against the defendants alleged a commonly
known "Bivens action. '"421 Initially, the circuit court noted that
in determining the role of the doctrine of exhaustion in the Biv-
417 Id. at 568.
418 Id. at 569-70.
419 Id. at 569.
420 Id. at 570.
421 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (lawsuit
alleging Constitutional tort violations against government officials).
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ens context, the initial focus is on Congressional intent.42 2 More-
over, where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, some
judicial discretion governs. In exercising that discretion, federal
courts are to balance the interests of the individual in retaining
prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing
institutional interests favoring exhaustion.M
Although Congress has developed an administrative appeal
structure for reviewing FAA orders, the circuit court found that
the review structure does not provide a forum for redressing
constitutional violations against individual FAA inspectors with
monetary damages. As such, the circuit court conducted a bal-
ancing test described above in its sound discretion.424
While agreeing with the other circuit courts that had already
addressed the issue by ruling that parties may not avoid an ad-
ministrative review simply by fashioning their attacks on an FAA
decision as a constitutional or tort claim against individual FAA
officers, Zephyr's particular claims did not implicate that con-
cern. This was because Zephyr's claims did not relate to an FAA
order currently pending against it. In fact, there had never
been an order of revocation to appeal. Moreover, Zephyr was
seeking monetary relief for alleged extra procedural and uncon-
stitutional actions by FAA inspectors. The administrative appeal
procedures provide no such relief. For all of these reasons, the
circuit court declined to impose a traditional exhaustion re-
quirement on Bivens actions against FAA officials when the Biv-
ens suit does not implicate existing FAA enforcement actions. As
such, the circuit court ruled that the district court erred in con-
cluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
Zephyr's Bivens action.425
c. No Implied Private Cause of Action under 49 U.S.C.
§ 44711
In Spinner v. Verbridge, the plaintiff sued the defendant for in-
juries caused as a result of an aircraft takeoff accident in which
the defendant was the pilot in command. 426 After the crash, the
plaintiff discovered that the defendant was not properly certi-
,122 Id. at 571.
423 Id. at 570-71.
424 [(. at 571.
425 Id. at 573. That being said, the Court nevertheless affirmed the lower
court's order and dismissed Zephyr's lawsuit, finding under Rule 12(b) (6) that
Zephyr had not alleged claims for which relief could be granted. Id. at 573-74.
42( Spinner v. Verbridge, 125 F. Supp. 2d 45, 45-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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fled as a pilot and had not been for some time. Plaintiff
brought the suit in federal district court alleging as its sole basis
for jurisdiction two provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, specifically 49 U.S.C. §§ 4471(A)(1) and (A)(2).427 The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, contending that the sections of the Federal Aviation
Act relied upon by the plaintiff did not provide for either an
express or an implied private cause of action.
The court noted that it was clear that no express private cause
of action existed, but not so clear that no implied cause of ac-
tion existed. Moreover, although courts within the circuit had
found no private right of action within a number of other sec-
tions of the Federal Aviation Act, courts had not yet addressed
this particular section. The court therefore conducted its own
analysis of whether an implied private right of action could be
read into the statute under the four part test established by the
Supreme Court in Court v. Ashe. The court determined that
Congress had not created an implied private cause of action
under the particular section and dismissed the case
accordingly. u8
d. No Antitrust SMJ under FTAIA
In 1999, the International Air Transport Association ("IATA")
decided to lower the commissions paid to IATA accredited
travel agents in Central America and Panama to a flat rate of
seven percent. Prior to this time, the commission rates paid to
travel agents in Latin American and Caribbean varied depend-
ing on the country, and in the case of Peru, Panama, Bolivia and
Nicaragua, the commission rate was as high as ten to eleven per-
cent. In response, a group of IATA accredited travel agents in
Latin America sued several major American air carriers and
IATA in Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines, Inc. The agents al-
leged that the defendants acted in concert to lower the commis-
sion rates in violation of the United States antitrust laws with
devastating effects on the plaintiffs' businesses and the business
members of the proposed class.429
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint on
several grounds, including the ground that the court lacked sub-
427 Id. at 46.
428 Id. at 47-48, 52 (citing Court v. Ashe, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
429 Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 829, 829-39
(E.D. Pa. 2001).
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ject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims because U.S.
antitrust laws do not regulate competitive conditions in foreign
countries. In addressing defendants' motions, the Court recog-
nized that American antitrust laws generally do not regulate the
competitive conditions of other nations' economies. Moreover,
in 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ment Act ("FTAIA") 411° to facilitate the export of domestic goods
by exempting from the Sherman Act export transactions that
did not injure the U.S. economy. Thereby, Congress relieved
exporters from a competitive disadvantage in foreign trade.43'
Under FTAIA:
[A]ntitrust conduct involving United States export commerce
with foreign nations is actionable only if that conduct has a direct
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on one of the fol-
lowing: (1) on United States domestic commerce; (2) on United
States import commerce; or (3) on export commerce only to the
extent that such conduct injures export business in the United
States.432
Thus, the situs of the defendants' conduct does not control,
rather the location where the effect of that conduct is felt con-
trols. Also, FTAIA precludes subject matter jurisdiction over
claims by foreign plaintiffs against defendants where the situs of
the injury is overseas and that injury arises from effects in a
nondomestic market. As such, the court granted defendants'
motion for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over the matter because plaintiffs could allege no harm within
the United States. 433
3. Forum Non Conveniens
a. Dismissal Warranted Where Foreign Countries Provided
Adequate Forum
In Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., Sundstrand appealed to the
Ninth Circuit concerning the district court's dismissal of it's suit
on the basis of forum non convenzens.434 This case arose out of the
crash of a de Havilland DHC-8 aircraft on June 5, 1995 in New
Zealand operated by Ansett New Zealand ("Ansett"). As the
crew was preparing to land, the landing gear failed to lower hy-
430 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2002).
431 Turicentro, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
432 Id. at 833.
433 Id. at 834.
434 Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001).
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draulically. The crew apparently became distracted while at-
tempting to lower the gear manually, and flew the aircraft
towards hilly terrain in the area. Although the aircraft's ground
proximity warning system ("GPWS") sounded an alarm, it was
only four seconds before the aircraft crashed. The crash killed
one member of the flight crew and three passengers, and it in-
jured the remaining fifteen passengers.4"'
The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona against the Canadian manufacturer of
the aircraft and the American manufacturers of the GPWS and
the radio altimeter. The district court granted the defendants'
motion for dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens.43"
Because forum non conveniens dismissal first requires that an
adequate alternative forum be available to the plaintiff, the
plaintiffs urged on appeal that New Zealand offers no remedy
for their losses because it has "legislated tort law out of exis-
tence." '437 This was based on a 1972 act passed by the New Zea-
land legislature which provides no-fault coverage for those who
suffer personal injuries arising from accidents. This act gener-
ally covered medical costs, limited compensation for lost earn-
ings to 80% of the claimant's former salary with an additional
cap in place, and eliminated lump sum payments for
noneconomic losses.4
The circuit court ruled, however, that the proper question is
not whether the plaintiffs could bring a personal injury lawsuit
of the type they wanted to bring in the United States, rather it is
whether New Zealand offers a remedy for their losses at all.
Moreover, it is not an appropriate basis to hold that a forum non
conveniens dismissal is inappropriate where the foreign forum
has less favorable law. The question simply is whether or not the
foreign forum offers an adequate remedy.43
The circuit court also reviewed the lower court's balancing of
the private interest and public interest factors required in a fo-
rum non conveniens analysis. The lower court felt that private in-
terests favored trial in the foreign country, primarily because the
court recognized that while important evidence existed in both
fora, the district court could not compel production of much of
435 Id. at 1140-41.
436 Id. at 1140.
437 Id. at 1143.
438 Id. at 1141-42.
439 Id. at 1144-45.
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the New Zealand evidence, whereas the parties controlled, and
therefore could bring, all of the United States evidence to New
Zealand.44 The court found three public interest factors: (1)
local interest in the lawsuit, (2) the burden on local courts, and
(3) the cost of resolving the dispute in an unrelated forum.
Nonetheless the court ruled that New Zealand had a much
higher level of public interest in addressing the litigation.
Therefore, because New Zealand did provide an adequate fo-
rum, and the public and private interests all weighed in favor of
New Zealand, the circuit court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion to dismiss the action on the basis of forum non conveniens.44'
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a forum non conveniens dismis-
sal in Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.442 This case arose from the
crash of a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 aircraft being operated by
Austral Airlines between two points in Argentina in October of
1997. Several decedents' representatives brought the case in the
United States against McDonnell Douglas alleging products lia-
bility and negligence claims. The district court dismissed the
action based on forum non conveniens.443
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that Argentina did not pro-
vide an adequate forum for the dispute because the manufac-
turer was not amenable to process in Argentina even if the
manufacturer consented to jurisdiction in Argentina's courts.
As evidence on this point both parties introduced conflicting
affidavits from two Argentinean law professors. The district
court found that the defendants had introduced some evidence
that Argentina was an appropriate forum. So the court condi-
tioned its order of dismissal on the manufacturer consenting to
any Argentine judgment against it, agreeing to conduct all dis-
covery in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and voluntarily producing documents and witnesses within the
United States. The circuit court ruled that the district court's
actions were not an abuse of discretion.444
The circuit court also reviewed the district court's balancing
of public and private factors and found that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the private and pub-
lic factors weighed in favor of dismissal. Therefore, the Circuit
440 /d. at 1146-47.
+11 Id. at 1148.
42 Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).
-1-1 Id. at 1281.
14 Id. at 1283.
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Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal on the basis of forum
non conveniens.
4 5
b. Defendant Failed to Meet Burden of Proof
In McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403
(5th Cir. 2001), discussed at length above in the portion of this
paper addressing manufacturer liabilities, the court also briefly
addressed the manufacturer's motion to dismiss on the basis of
forum non conveniens. As in the Satz case, the parties had set up a
battle of dueling affidavits between legal experts in the forum
jurisdiction, each alleging that that jurisdiction either was or was
not an adequate alternative forum to jurisdiction in the United
States. In this case, however, the district court felt that the de-
fendant did not meet its burden in showing that Alberta, Ca-
nada was an adequate alternative forum and that the public and
private factors weighed in favor of dismissal. As such, the Circuit
Court affirmed the district court's decision to not dismiss on the
basis of forum non conveniens.446
c. Plaintiff Waived Foreign Forum in Underlying Agreement
In AAR International, Inc. v. Nimelias Enterprises S.A., the Sev-
enth Circuit reviewed an appeal of a forum non conveniens mo-
tion in the context of a lawsuit over an alleged breach of the
lease of a Boeing 737 aircraft.447 Here, the underlying lease con-
tained a non-mandatory, or permissive, forum selection clause,
as well as a representation that the parties would not object to
jurisdiction in an Illinois court on the basis of inconvenience.
In light of this posture, the court determined that rather than
using the traditional analysis, the standard for reviewing this
freely negotiated forum selection clause was that it would be
presumptively valid and enforceable unless (1) its incorporation
into the underlying contract was the result of fraud, undue in-
fluence or overwhelming bargaining power; (2) it was so gravely
difficult and inconvenient that the complaining party would for
all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court; or (3) its
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy in the fo-
rum in which the suit was brought as declared by statute orjudi-
cial decision.448
445 Id. at 1283-84.
446 d. at 422-25.
447 AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Nimelias Enterprises S.A., 250 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2001).
448 Id. at 523-24.
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Under this test, the court ruled that the party seeking to ne-
gate the selection clause had not met its burden in overcoming
the clause's presumptive validity. Moreover, the court noted
that although the forum selection clause in issue was a permis-
sive clause, because the parties had also agreed to not challenge
venue on the basis of inconvenience it would be incongruous
for the court to not enforce the parties' clear and express agree-
ment to acceptjurisdiction in the courts of Illinois. As such, the
court ruled that the forum selection clause was fully
enforceable.449
4. Venue
In TM Claims Serv. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, plaintiff TM
Claims Service, Inc., filed an action as subrogee for its insured
Fuji Foto Film, Inc. against defendant KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
in New York state court. " "° The defendant removed the action
to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Several months later the defendant filed a motion to
transfer the action to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404A on
the grounds that the litigation had no connection with the State
of New York and transfer would be for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.451
In reviewing the defendant's motion, the court noted that
while the plaintiff's choice of forum is to be given strong consid-
eration, the factors in this particular matter weighed in favor of
transferring the matter to Georgia. Specifically, the plaintiff
could have properly brought the action in the Northern District
of Georgia because substantial events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred there and the defendant conducted business
and was subject to personal jurisdiction there. Moreover, the
court found (1) there was no evidence that the goods entered or
passed through New York, and the handling of the claim by the
subrogee's employees of New York did not necessarily mean that
they had personal knowledge of the events that allegedly caused
the damage; (2) the alleged damage occurred in the northern
,44 Id. at 525-26. The Court also addressed in the bulk of its opinion interest-
ing and complex issues regarding abstention and parallel proceedings under the
Colorado River Doctrine with respect to the proceedings involving the same dispute
occurring in Greek courts.
450 TM Claims Serv. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 143 F. Supp. 2d 402
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
451 Id. at 402-03.
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district of Georgia; (3) most of the material witnesses were lo-
cated in Georgia; (4) several nonparty witnesses were located in
Georgia, where a Georgia court would be in a better position to
compel their testimony; and finally (5) the interests of justice
based on the totality of the circumstances favored transfer to the
Georgia court.4 52 As such, the Court granted defendant's mo-
tion to transfer.
5. Evidence
In McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., Inc., discussed at
length above, the court primarily ruled that the plaintiffs had
failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain their negligence
and products liability allegations.453
In Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., also discussed above,
Federal Express alleged a claim for spoliation of evidence
against Fujitsu.4 54 The court determined that plaintiff was not
guilty of spoliation, because Federal Express was on notice that
plaintiff had in its possession the damaged goods that were the
subject of the suit, yet Federal Express never requested to in-
spect those goods before the plaintiff received written instruc-
tions from its insurance carrier to dispose of the goods.
Although the plaintiff should not have disposed of the material,
its act in doing so did not rise to the level necessary to support a
claim for spoliation of evidence. 5
In Friesen-Hall v. Colle, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed
the question of how much and what type of evidence was suffi-
cient to establish who was acting as pilot in command of an air-
craft that crashed.4 56 The aircraft was a Piper PA38 Tomahawk,
which crashed in March 1994. On board was a private pilot and
a certified flight instructor. The purpose of the flight was the
private pilot's biennial flight review. A dispute arose as to which
of the two pilots was actually flying the aircraft at the time of the
crash. The pilot's surviving spouse filed a lawsuit alleging that
the flight instructor was flying the aircraft and that the aircraft
crashed due to his negligence. The trial court determined that
the plaintiff was unable to produce any admissible evidence that
the flight instructor was actually flying the airplane at the time
452 1. at 403-07.
453 McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403 (5th Cir.
2001).
454 Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001).
455 Id. at 435-36.
456 Friesen-Hall v. Colle, 17 P.3d 349 (Kan. 2001).
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of the crash. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant.457
On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the trial court erred by
finding that there was no admissible evidence to support her
claim that the flight instructor was flying the aircraft at the time
of the crash. The court determined that the dispositive question
for the entire dispute was whether the identity and alleged negli-
gence of the pilot could be proven by circumstantial
evidence.4 -8
In analyzing this question, the court looked to its own prior
precedent in In re Estate of Hayden459 and In re Estate of Rivers,46 0
which together set the standard in Kansas that a finding that a
pilot is at the controls of an aircraft at the moment of its crash
must not be predicated upon speculation, surmise or conjec-
ture. Moreover, other jurisdictions had considered these
cases, leading one court to surmise that there are two extremes
of thought with respect to using circumstantial evidence to es-
tablish pilot identity and negligence in a plane crash. At one
end-represented by the Kansas Supreme Court's Hayden and
Rivers decisions-courts will not submit the question to a jury
based solely on circumstantial evidence. On the other end was
the "pilot-in-command" doctrine, based on that term's defini-
tion in the FARs. These courts hold that the designated pilot-in-
command is responsible for the negligent act, irrespective of
whether he or she was in actual control of the aircraft at the
time of the crash.46(
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the standard announced
in Hayden and Rivers too heavily burdened a plaintiff in a negli-
gence case because it was contrary to the burden of proof in civil
cases generally, and that the court should instead adopt the pi-
lot-in-command doctrine. The court declined to adopt this doc-
trine, because neither Hayden nor Rivers, nor the cases cited to
by plaintiff in support of the doctrine, contemplated what the
court referred to as an "examination" situation (i.e., a flight be-
ing conducted for the purposes of a biennial flight review of an
already-rated pilot)."': At the end of the day, the court decided
457 1(1. at 351.
,458 Id. at 352.
4 In re Estate of Hayden, 254 P.2d 813 (Kan. 1953).
• In re Estate of Rivers, 267 P.2d 506 (Kan. 1954).
,161 Fiesen-Hall, 17 P.3d at 352-54.
-162 Id. at 354.
,;63 Id. at 354-55.
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to maintain its prior standard, ruling that the trial court did not
err because, even resolving all facts and inferences in favor of
the plaintiff, the question as to who was piloting the aircraft
when the airplane crashed was still left to speculation, surmise
and conjecture.464
K. MISCELLANEOUS Topics
1. Labor and Employment Issues
In Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Second Circuit
heard the plaintiffs appeal from an order and accompanying
judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York granting defendant Delta Airlines, Inc.'s
motion for summary judgment.4 15  The lawsuit arose from
Delta's efforts to integrate the pilot seniority lists of Delta and
Pan Am Airlines when Delta absorbed Pan Am after its 1991
bankruptcy.4""
In 1994, a group of former Pan Am pilots and flight engineers
who Delta had hired filed suit in New York state court alleging
age discrimination under the New York State human rights stat-
ute. The discrimination was based on three policies adopted in
the Pan Am asset purchase agreement. Specifically, the policies
included: the seniority lists integration methodology, a ten-year
service requirement for full post medical retirement benefits,
and a three year period of pay disparity."'
The district court eventually granted Delta's motion for sum-
mary judgment and dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims be-
cause the plaintiffs had failed to established a prima facie case of
age discrimination. 6 On appeal, the Second Circuit ruled that
while the district court had erroneously concluded that plaintiffs
had not met their prima facie burden, the plaintiffs had ad-
duced no evidence that Delta's legitimate and nondiscrimina-
tory explanations for each of the challenged employment terms
were false. On that basis, the Second Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court.469"
In Bertulli v. Independent Association of Continental Pilots, the
Fifth Circuit addressed an appeal arising out a controversy over
464 Id. at 355.
465 Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456 (2d Cir. 2001).
466 Id. at 461-62.
467 Id. at 463-65.
468 Id. at 465.
46a Id. at 466-70.
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a pilot's seniority list.47 The pilots originally filed a class action
against their pilot's association and their employer claiming
they suffered injury as a result of their lost seniority when the
pilot's association and airline changed the seniority rankings of
their pilots. On the defendants' appeal from the district court
certification order under Rule 23(f), the defendants argued that
the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the certification of the
class was an abuse of discretion.47" '
In response to the standing argument, the circuit court ruled
that the plaintiffs did have standing, because the pilot's associa-
tion had deprived them of seniority without a vote and without
fair representation from the pilot's association. With respect to
the class certification issue, the circuit court ruled that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in finding certification to
be appropriate for the claims due to the economies of class
treatment and the numerous common issues that weighed in
favor of class treatment.472
In United Airlines, Inc. v. International Association of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers, plaintiff United Airlines appealed from the
denial of a preliminary injunction against defendant Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
("LAM"). The plaintiff sought the injunction to compel IAM to
assert every reasonable effort to discourage its member mechan-
ics from engaging in a concerted work slowdown at United.47
The controversy arose out of difficult labor negotiations be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant, during which the plaintiff as-
serted that the defendant was encouraging or facilitating
deliberate slowdowns as part of its bargaining tactics. A district
court originally issued a temporary restraining order against
IAM, 7 but later declined to enter a preliminary injunction, rul-
ing that it would be more appropriate for the airlines to target
specific individuals who were still conducting slowdown activities
rather than issue a broad order for all members of the union. 47 5
On appeal, the circuit court ruled that the district court's fail-
ure to issue the injunction effectively denied United of ajudicial
470 Bertulli V. Independent Ass'n of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290 (5th Cir.
2001).
471 I(. at 293-94.
472 Id. at 295-99.
4 73 United Airlines, Inc. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 243
F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2001).
•174 Id. at 356-58.
47 Id. at 358-60.
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remedy to which it was untitled under the Railway Labor Act.
The district court had erred as a matter of law when it rejected
injunction on the basis that United could address the slowdown
by disciplining or firing the individual workers responsible. The
court held that requiring the carrier to do so was tantamount to
making it assume the union's own enforceable duty to end the
slowdown. Moreover, an injunction was the sole effective means
of enforcing the union's duties under its duty to maintain the
status quo during contract negotiations, especially given the dis-
trict court's own conclusion that a number of mechanics were
engaging in a deliberate and unlawful slowdown.476
In Fairbairn v. United Airlines, Inc., the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided whether an employment dispute between
David Fairbairn, a former airline reservation agent, and his for-
mer employer, United Airlines, Inc., was subject to compulsory
arbitration before an appropriate adjustment board under the
Railway Labor Act when Fairbairn was not covered by any collec-
tive bargaining agreement nor represented by any union.477
The district court originally entered summary judgment in favor
of United. Later, the court modified its judgment and ordered
the parties to pursue arbitration pursuant to that Act. United
appealed, contending that the district court improperly as-
sumed that the "minor dispute" provisions of the Railway Labor
Act applied to Fairbairn, even though he was not covered by a
collective bargaining agreement nor represented by a labor
union."'
On appeal, the circuit court determined that binding prece-
dent limits the Railway Labor Act's scope to agreements reached
after collective bargaining. Although the Act permits an em-
ployee to reject union assistance and pursue a grievance inde-
pendently, the employee must still be subject to a collective
bargaining agreement and therefore be represented generally
by the union. Moreover, contrary to Fairbairn's claims, the no-
tices that United placed in its workplaces indicating that dis-
putes were to be handled according to the Railway Labor Act
did not extend the Act's coverage to disputes not required to be
covered under the Act. Finally, the benefits received by
Fairbairn as a result of the collective bargaining agreements did
not automatically confer standing upon him to enforce the
476 Id. at 361-69.
477 Fairbairn v. United Airlines, Inc., 250 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2001).
478 Id. at 238-40.
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terms of those agreements. As such, because Fairbairn's rela-
tionship with United was governed only by an individual con-
tract and he was not a member of the union nor subject to its
collective bargaining agreements, the circuit court ruled that
the district court's order compelling arbitration was
improper.479
In Adames v. Executive Airlines, Inc., a group of ninety-four
flight attendants sued the defendant for violations of various Pu-
erto Rico labor laws, arguing that they were entitled to compen-
sation dealing with issues such as wages, overtime pay, maternity
pay, and so forth.480 The district court ruled that the Railway
Labor Act preempted the suit, depriving it of subject matter ju-
risdiction. 41 The circuit court affirmed, ruling that because the
issues raised by the plaintiffs required interpretation of the ap-
plicable collective bargaining agreement they involved "minor
disputes" within the meaning of the Act. Thus, the lower court's
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was appropriate.48 2
2. Antitrust Issues
Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC arose out of
intense competition between Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited
("Virgin") and British Airways PLC ("British Airways") over slot
allocations at London's Heathrow Airport.4 3 As a consequence
of that competition, Virgin filed a complaint against British Air-
ways alleging restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act and attempted monopolization under Section 2 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.484
The restraint of trade claim focused on certain incentive
agreements British Airways had with travel agencies and corpo-
rate customers. The attempted monopolization claim focused
on Virgin's assertions that British Airways included customers to
shift to British Airways flights priced below cost. The district
court granted summary judgment to British Airways primarily
because Virgin had failed to support its experts' theories of an-
479 Id. at 240-44.
480 Adames v. Exec. Airlines, Inc., 258 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2001).
481 Id. at 10.
4' Id. at 12-16.
483 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir.
2001).
484 Id. at 259-62.
1206
2002] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
ticompetitive practices with factual evidence pertaining to the
various routes for which Virgin claimed it had suffered injury."'
On appeal, the circuit court found that British Airways' incen-
tive agreements did not constitute an illegal restraint of trade,
because Virgin had failed to allege that the travel agencies and
corporate customers who benefited under the incentive agree-
ments agreed to do anything in exchange for the benefits they
received. In response to the second claim, the circuit court
found that British Airways did not violate Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act by adding flights to accommodate increased traffic that
resulted from its incentive agreements. Virgin argued that the
agreements resulted in incremental passengers being charged
below cost fares, but the court noted that Virgin failed to estab-
lish that British Airways recouped its losses by overpricing tickets
on its monopoly routes. Moreover, Virgin had failed to offer
evidence that the carrier possessed monopoly power in one mar-
ket and then used it to gain competitive advantage in a differ-
ent.48 6 As such, the circuit court affirmed the lower court's
summary judgment in favor of British Airways.
Note from the Editor: The author recognizes the change in opinion,
but thought it appropriate to leave the original paper intact as it was
presented at the SMU Air Law Symposium and highlight the change to
the reader through an editor's note.
The companion cases of Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Air-
lines, Inc.4 7 ("Continental I") and Continental Airlines, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc.48 ("Continental II") arose out of defendants
United Airlines, Inc.'s ("United") and the Dulles Airport Man-
agement Council's ("AMC") decision to place carry-on bag siz-
ing templates at all security checkpoints at the Washington
Dulles International Airport. In April 2000, the defendants
agreed, over Continental's objections, to install the sizing tem-
plates at the Dulles Airport's passenger security checkpoints,
forcing all of Continental's customers to comply with United
Airlines' carry-on baggage sizing restrictions. Shortly after the
templates were put into place, Continental brought suit against
the defendants alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Continental's claim was that the sizing templates
485 Id. at 263.
486 Id. at 265-73.
487 Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D.
Va. 2001), vacated, 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
488 Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D.
Va. 2001), vacated, 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
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eliminated the competitive advantage Continental enjoyed from
its expanded aircraft baggage storage bins and its flexible, pas-
senger-friendly carry-on baggage policies and practices.48
In Continental I, the district court found that the defendant's
actions constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.49° In Continental II, the district
court determined the amount of damages Continental was enti-
tled to as well as the form of injunctive relief appropriate to the
defendant's antitrust violation. 49 1
In Continental II, the court noted that two types of monetary
relief are available for such a violation: lost profits or the cost of
mitigation. Because Continental offered no proof of lost profits,
the analysis focused on the cost of mitigation. On that point,
the court decided that no genuine issue of material fact existed,
because Continental's mitigation cost totaled approximately
$84,000, which under Section 4 of the Clayton Act was trebled to
approximately $254,000.492
With respect to Continental's requested injunctive relief, the
court rejected the defendants' proposed scheme which allowed
Continental passengers to use a "medallion" in order to bypass
the security templates. The court determined that the only ap-
propriate injunctive relief was an order enjoining the defend-
ants from employing any type of baggage sizing template at the
security checkpoints at Dulles.4"'
In United States v. AMR Corp.,494 the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas issued an extensive opinion ad-
dressing the United States' allegations that defendants AMR
Corporation, American Airlines, Inc., and AMR Eagle Holding
Company participated in a predatory scheme pricing against low
cost carriers in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
claims arose out of competition between American Airlines and
several smaller low cost carriers on various airline routes cen-
tered on the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport from 1995
to 1997.
American Airlines moved for summary judgment, arguing
that it competed against the low cost carriers on the merits and
that its conduct was not unlawful under the Antitrust Acts. At
489 Continental II, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 544-45.
4911 Continental 1,126 F. Supp. 2d at 978-82.
491 Continental II, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
492 Continental II, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 54548.
493 Continental II, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 548-52.
494 United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001).
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the end of a 7 6-page opinion, the court concluded that the gov-
ernment's claims in the case failed. In short, the court found
that: (1) American did not price below an appropriate measure
of costs, (2) evidence showed that American priced its fares con-
sistently above its variable costs, (3) the government's claims
with respect to question of recruitment failed from a pervasive
failure of proof, and (4) the government's allegations with re-
spect to reputation liability were inappropriate. Accordingly,
the court granted defendant American's Motion for Summary
Judgment.4 5
3. Criminal Actions
In United States v. Mendoza, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a case in which a man attempted to assist his girlfriend
in making a connecting flight by calling in a bomb threat to the
airline.496 On the evening of December 29, 1999, Flavio David
Mendoza ("Mendoza") took his girlfriend to the St. Louis air-
port where she was to board a TransWorld Airlines flight to San
Francisco that would connect to a Korean Airlines flight
("KAL") to Seoul, Korea. Because the girlfriend missed her
original flight, she was told that she might not make her con-
necting flight in San Francisco.
Once the girlfriend was en route to San Francisco, Mendoza
placed a number of calls to KAL, inquiring whether his girl-
friend would be able to make the flight. Fearing that she would
not make the connection, Mendoza made an anonymous phone
call from a pay phone near his home to the San Francisco air-
port, in which he stated that he had heard that there might be a
bomb on board the KAL flight.
The call obviously raised a great deal of alarm among the air-
port security and KAL officials. KAL compared the threat with
recordings of the previous calls from Mendoza, and determined
that Mendoza had made the bomb-threat. Mendoza's girlfriend
confirmed KAL's conclusion when KAL played the tape for her.
As a result of the call, the aircraft, which had already launched,
started to return to San Francisco. Once KAL had identified
Mendoza, however, the crew was informed that the call had
been a hoax, and they elected to return to their original head-
ing to Seoul and completed the flight uneventfully.
497
41 Id. at 1218-19.
496 United States v. Mendoza, 244 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2001).
497 Id. at 1040-41.
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The government indicted Mendoza on one count of violating
18 U.S.C. § 844(e) and one count of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 32(a) (6). The second count charged that Mendoza willfully
communicated information knowing the information to be false
and under circumstances in which such information could be
reasonably believed, thereby endangering the safety of an air-
craft in flight. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
§ 844 charge and it was eventually dismissed. However, the jury
did return a guilty verdict on the § 32(a) (6) charge, which Men-
doza appealed.
On appeal, Mendoza argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence that he had actually endangered the flight. The court
concluded that the danger to the flight created by Mendoza's
call was above and beyond the danger inherent in routine flying:
The stress to the pilots, coupled with the increased flying time
caused by the bomb scare, made for a situation seldom exper-
ienced on an aircraft and created a level of danger not normally
present. The government produced sufficient evidence for ra-
tional trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Flight
24 was endangered while in flight.498
Mendoza also argued that he was prejudiced by the govern-
ment's use of a dictionary definition of "endangerment" during
its closing argument. Also Mendoza argued that if the flight was
endangered, Mendoza was not responsible because intervening
actors broke the chain of causation. The court of appeals dis-
missed each argument in turn. 49 Finally, the court also dis-
missed Mendoza's complaints concerning certain testimony that
admitted jury instructions with respect to the Section 32 charge.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court,
and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari:""'
In United States v. Abozid, the Second Circuit affirmed the con-
viction in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York against one of the defendants for conspiracy to
traffic in unauthorized access devices with the intent to de-
fraud. 0' l The unauthorized access devices were ticket stock
bearing account numbers that defendants had received as travel
agents. The defendants would sell the tickets at pure profits
without reimbursing the airlines for the stock. Finding that the
498 Id. at 1043.
499 Id. at 1043-46.
500 Id.
,i United States v. Abozid, 257 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).
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district court committed no reversible erred, the Second Circuit
confirmed the convictions.
In United States v. Teubner, defendant Richard Teubner moved
to dismiss certain counts of the indictment charging him with
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(6).5 o2 The indictment charged
Teubner with knowingly selling 49 separate aircraft engine parts
that were both flight-critical and life-limited using falsified FAA
Forms 8130-3 airworthiness approval tags, and falsifying aircraft
engine log book entries.5" 3 Teubners argued that under Section
32(a) (6) the government must show that the aircraft was in
flight when its safety is endangered. Essentially, the section does
not criminalize a communication about an aircraft part at a re-
mote place that is made without knowledge that the part will
ever be installed on any particular aircraft.50 4
In response, the court found that a plain reading of the stat-
ute "teaches that it is enough that [the defendant] willfully com-
municated information knowing it was false and under
circumstances in which the information could reasonably be be-
lieved, as a result of his intentional conduct, an aircraft was en-
dangered while in flight.''51 5  Dismissing Teubner's other
arguments as well, the court denied his motion to dismiss the
various counts in the indictment against him.50 6
III. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATORY ISSUE:
PROMULGATION OF THE NEW SUBPART K ON
AIRCRAFT FRACTIONAL OWNERSHIP
The final topic of this paper is the FAA's promulgation of new
regulations regarding the ownership and operation of aircraft
fractional ownership shares in the United States. Without delv-
ing into the topic in detail,50 7 it is worth noting that the long-
502 United States v. Teubner, Crim. No. 3:00-CR-214-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14855 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2001).
503 Tuebner, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14855, at *2-3.
504 Id. at *3-5.
505 Id. at *5-6.
506 Id. at *7-11.
507 For an excellent article that explains in detail the history of fractional own-
ership in the United States and the efforts to reach an industry consensus with
respect to regulating this fast-growing segment of the business aviation commu-
nity, see Eileen M. Gleimer, When Less Can Be More: Fractional Ownership of Air-
craft-The Wings of the Future, 64J. AIR L. & CoM. 979 (1999).
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awaited Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued by the FAA
on July 18, 2001.58
In short, the proposal would create a new Subpart K of Part 91
of the FARs and eliminate some operational and regulatory dis-
parities between fractional and charter providers, while allowing
the fractional providers to continue operating much as they
have been since their inception. 5119
508 66 F.R. 37520 (Jul. 18, 2001). The comment period was subsequently ex-
tended several times due to the events of September 11, 2001.
509 See, e.g., Summary to NPRM, Regulation of Fractional Aircraft Ownership
Programs and On-Demand Operations, 66 F.R. 37520, at 37520 (Jul. 18, 2001).
